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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores whether Japan’s energy marketplace reforms after the 2011 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, as outlined and executed by the Ministry of Economy, 
Industry, and Trade (METI), will aid Japan in achieving greater energy security. This 
thesis qualitatively evaluates the state of reforms administered in various energy sectors 
(fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable technologies) and comments on their 
feasibility against Japan's energy transition goals within the energy trilemma. The 
conclusion reached is that of the two milestones set by METI (2030 and 2050), Japan will 
likely miss the energy target for 2030, but 2050 outcomes are promising with continued 
reform, liberalization of energy markets, and penetration of innovation within the energy 
sector. Japan’s carbon dioxide emission reduction goals in combating climate change are 
misaligned with their desired energy portfolio. Use of liquid natural gas is quickly 
replacing oil and coal, which is likely to shift Japan’s supply chain toward Southeast Asia 
and the United States but does little to reduce import dependence. A restart of nuclear 
power plants has been delayed, exacerbating traditional fuel demand signal. The 
renewable energy sector faces bureaucratic headwinds and market saturation. 
Liberalization of power generation and transmission markets, along with the elimination 
of curtailment policies, are likely to alleviate saturation and provide greater market 
penetration for Japan to become energy secure. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research investigates whether the policy initiatives pursued by the Japanese 
government in the wake of the March 11, 2011, Fukushima nuclear disaster will be 
sufficient for Japan to meet their energy security portfolio for sustainable energy security? 
Japan’s Fifth Strategic Energy Plan document discusses the requirements and trade-offs 
for access, affordability, implementation, and sustainment within its energy trilemma.1 The 
energy trilemma requires Japan to develop an analytical framework with robust 
measurement variables such as overall supply, overall demand, cradle-to-grave cost 
structure, logistical volatility, safety considerations, reserve production margin at peak 
demand, environmental opportunity cost, industry adaptation rate, per-capita energy 
expenditure, and consumer incentives just to name a few. Each viable energy source has 
unique strengths and weaknesses for long-term sustainability. This research qualitatively 
evaluates each alternative to fossil fuel in terms of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats to determine whether Japan’s energy security strategy is reforming the energy 
marketplace to achieve Japan’s future consumer and industrial energy requirements. 
B. CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION 
Energy security is broadly defined as the “availability of energy at all times, in 
various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at affordable prices, without unacceptable or 
irreversible impact on the economy or the environment.”2 The energy security dialogue in 
Japan only intensified after the Fukushima catastrophe. 
The Japanese government has acknowledged its vulnerability in its current energy 
analysis models. Japan recognizes the absolute requirement and the significance of meeting 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Cabinet Decision on the New Strategic Energy Plan 
(Tokyo, Japan: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2018), 
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/pdf/0703_002c.pdf.  
2 Vlado Vivoda, Energy Security in Japan: Challenges after Fukushima (London, UK: Routledge, 
2016), 5, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315579566. 
2 
their energy security with a diverse energy portfolio. With minimal domestic fossil fuel 
production, Japan must have a resilient energy portfolio composed of advanced nuclear 
power and renewable sources, such as wind, geothermal, solar, bio-energy, and 
hydroelectric power, to maintain Japan’s economic competitiveness while balancing 
capital resource constraints, resource politics, economic necessity, demographic changes, 
and environmental constraints in developing policy responses. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Japan is an important industrialized ally of the United States in the Far East. Japan 
still has the world’s third-largest economy despite experiencing two decades of slow 
growth. The Japanese economy heavily relies on net energy imports, even with an efficient 
pattern of use. The negative economic cost of Fukushima on the Japanese economy has 
spurred lawmakers to reprioritize energy consumption toward renewable resources. The 
causal anthropogenic effects of climate change, especially for an island nation, are more 
readily apparent and can significantly disrupt Japan’s economy and its national security. In 
turn, the Japanese government has steadily worked to reduce import dependence on fossil 
fuel for domestic energy security. Based on the current trend, by year 2100, there is an 80 
percent likelihood that climate change would depress Japan’s economy by more than 10 
percent.3 
As a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol) in 1977, the Japanese government has since taken a holistic 
approach to diversifying their energy mix. Since the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster, 
the political and economic forces have intensified the debate toward a safe, efficient, and 
effective domestic energy security for Japan. The Fukushima Daiichi incident imposed 
significant economic costs on Japan. As Samuels writes, “The official estimate of the 
physical cost of this disaster was put at 16.9 trillion yen—more than 10 trillion yen in 
buildings and nearly 4 trillion yen in power, communications, and transport infrastructure. 
                                                 
3 Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang and Edward Miguel, “Global Non-Linear Effect of 
Temperature on Economic Production,” Nature 527, no. 7577 (November 2015): 236, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature15725. 
3 
Standard & Poor’s, however, estimated that 20–50 trillion yen was more accurate.”4 
Japan’s economy cannot risk another Fukushima-type disaster. 
After World War II, the economic development in Japan focused on rapid 
industrialization and reconstruction. It was aided by an extensive use of fossil fuels 
powering growth and expansion due to its cost-effectiveness in energy security. In the 
decades following it, the oil crises and energy supply shocks of 1973 and 1979 forced the 
Japanese government to adopt policies and strategies to shore up energy access. Japan 
created stockpiling reserves, increased usage efficiency across all industrial sectors, and 
began investing in nuclear power generation to tame exogenous disruptions to its economy; 
hence, these efforts resulted in Japan becoming the most energy-efficient nation in the 
world.5 However, the Fukushima incident revived the political and economic debate 
around reducing import dependence in industry and consumer economy, while maximizing 
safety. With anthropogenic climate change at the forefront of the global discussion, 
reverting to relying only on fossil fuels is a politically contentious issue and not a viable 
option for the Japan in achieving a greater energy security.  
Nuclear energy safety concerns elevated the discussion of the role of nuclear 
reactors in energy production in the overall demand equation. After Fukushima, the 
majority of Japan’s nuclear power fleet was taken offline for safety evaluations, 
exacerbating the energy security problem. If Japan wishes to reduce foreign dependence 
on energy, it must find innovative solutions to produce energy domestically—for which 
nuclear power is an unavoidable part of the medium-term solution. Former Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi, once a proponent of a Japan “built on nuclear power,” has 
recently altered his position and said, “There is nothing more costly than nuclear power… 
[and] Japan should achieve zero nuclear plants and aim for a more sustainable society.”6 
                                                 
4 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11 Disaster and Change in Japan (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013), 
6.  
5 Vlado Vivoda, “Japan’s Energy Security Predicament Post-Fukushima,” Energy Policy 46 (July 
2012): 135, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.044.  
6 Martin Fackler, “Former Japanese Leader Declares Opposition to Nuclear Power,” New York Times, 
October 02, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/world/asia/former-prime-minister-declares-
opposition-to-nuclear-power-in-japan.html?_r=0&module=inline. 
4 
Today, Japanese politics led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe recognize the political cost of keeping nuclear fleets online, but nuclear fleets 
are absolutely essential in meeting Japan’s energy needs in a volatile energy market. 
Japan is also a net exporter of sophisticated technology; thus, a Japanese energy 
revolution will aid in solving energy security challenges abroad as well. Japan will have a 
more substantial impact in assisting developing nations to meet their own energy 
challenges, especially if the catastrophic events of global climate change continue to 
worsen. In keeping with pledges of Kyoto Protocol and Paris conferences on climate 
change, Japan is structurally shifting away from fossil fuels to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and supplement the energy deficiency with a National Energy and 
Environment Strategy for Technological Innovation towards 2050 (NEESTI). Advanced 
nuclear power generation, intelligent transport systems, improved structural materials, 
superconducting power transmission, and high-performance electricity storage are a few 
of the technologies outlined in NEESTI report that could be exported while supporting 
Japan’s policy goals.  
Energy market volatility has a direct and a causal reaction within the rest of the 
Japanese economy, ranging from automotive manufacturing to consumer electronics. 
Japan is a leading contributor of innovative and groundbreaking technologies within the 
world’s leading economies and a significant energy consumer even with an efficient pattern 
of use. Japanese technology is traded extensively around the world. A disruption in the 
energy security of Japan would have significant negative ripples within the global 
community. A forward-looking, renewable and sustainable energy strategy will be critical 
for Japan to maintain its economic prowess. 
Japan does not have an abundance of natural resources within its borders. Along 
with rising domestic consumption of energy, Japan must contend with the rising energy 
demand within the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in China and India, putting additional 
strain on the hydrocarbon-based energy supplies imported to Japan. Political leaders 
recognize this reality but their decisions are at the mercy of political forces, not grounded 
in loss-gain economic matrix. Japan should carefully navigate and negotiate resource 
diplomacy with other countries while developing an organic, domestic energy portfolio 
5 
that will enhance self-reliance in the interest of national security. The 2017 World Energy 
Trilemma Index ranks Japan at No. 30 in a grouping of energy security, energy equity, and 
environmental sustainability.7 While the Japanese leaders are continuously and rationally 
evaluating energy generation portfolio to meet Japan’s future energy needs, they must 
include a combination of reduced fossil fuels dependency, increased used of advanced 
nuclear power, and the largest-scale integration of renewable energy technology in the 
reformed economic structure and policy agenda. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In July 2018, the Japanese government, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI) and Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) jointly published 
a revised Fifth Strategic Energy Plan policy document for the Japanese economy. In it, 
Japan identified goals that would “contribute to further growth of the Japanese economy, 
improvement of the standard of living, and global development through an energy supply 
that is stable, sustainable long term, and independent.”8 Embedded within the document 
are objectives of safety through technological and governance reform, specific energy 
generation security by expanding the diversity of choice, environmental considerations by 
working toward decarbonisation, and economic efficiency to enhance domestic industrial 
competitiveness.9 
A declining population and lackluster economic growth have depressed the overall 
energy demand, specifically in end form electricity for Japan’s producers. In fact, today, 
the total demand in watt-hours has declined more than 10% compared to 2010. Following 
this current trend, demand will continue to slow through the 2030 and 2050 milestones, an 
important consideration in planning for energy security. By 2030, when combined with the 
projected energy efficiency of Japan, the total Japanese electrical demand is set to drop 
                                                 
7 World Energy Council, World Energy Trilemma Index 2018: Monitoring the Sustainability of 
National Energy Systems (London, UK: World Energy Council, 2018), 
https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2018/trilemma-report-2018. 
8 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Fifth Strategic Energy Plan (Tokyo, Japan: Agency for 
Natural Resources and Energy, 2018), https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/pdf/0703_002a.pdf. 
9 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 1. 
6 
from 1140-terawatt hour (TWh) to 868 TWh.10 As the overall demand weakens, the 
existing infrastructure will be able to support the industrial and consumer energy transition. 
Restructuring is likely to raise reliability and security within the trilemma and the Japanese 
economy as a whole.  
Essentially, the Japanese energy security policy responses are trying to address 
three distinct dimensions of the energy trilemma. The three broad dimensions of energy 
independence are energy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability.11  
Japan has failed to rank in the top 10 countries of the World Energy Trilemma Index 
(WETI) with greatest diversified energy security where Denmark, Switzerland, and 
Sweden are leading the charge, respectively. Japan has the technological know-how to 
certainly contend for top marks, but political forces often delay or restrict implementation 
of a broadly progressive agenda. WETI interprets energy security as the 
effective management of primary energy supply from domestic and external 
sources, the reliability of energy infrastructure, and the ability of energy 
providers to meet current and future demand. Energy equity is defined as—
accessibility and affordability of energy supply across the population, and 
environmental sustainability is defined as encompassing the achievement of 
supply-side and demand-side energy efficiencies and development of 
energy supply from renewable and other low-carbon sources.12  
Japan’s energy anxiety is a product of its rapid post-war industrial development and 
its economic development occurring through two significant oil supply shocks in the 1970s. 
Amid the crisis, the government responded quickly by creating energy stockpile 
requirements for the energy sector to shield against a future crisis. Although stockpiling 
requirements are an adequate near-term solution, it is not viable in the long-term because 
of the dynamic demands of the industrial sector, negotiated or pending open market futures 
contracts, and an overall energy market supply-demand volatility. The 1975 Petroleum 
                                                 
10 Tim Buckley and Simon Nicholas., Japan: Greater Energy Security through Renewables Electricity 
Transformation in a Post-Nuclear Economy (Cleveland, OH: Institute for Energy Economics and Financial 
Analysis, 2017), http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Japan_-Greater-Energy-Security-Through-
Renewables-_March-2017.pdf. 
11 World Energy Council, 9. 
12 World Energy Council, 9. 
7 
Stockpile Act required 70 days of reserves as measured by the previous year’s domestic 
consumption, which was further supplemented by the creation of the Japan National Oil 
Company (JNOC) in 1978, which raised an additional 36 days of oil reserves. Maintaining 
a significant reserve to guard against a shortage has remained a cornerstone of the Japanese 
government’s energy policy to this day. In addition to establishing stockpiles, Japan has 
taken additional steps to modernize and pursue higher efficiency from existing energy 
usage. With the 1979 Energy Conservation Act, the government established efficiency 
standards in all industries to reduce overall consumption and encourage an efficient pattern 
of use—leading to Japan’s place as a worldwide leader in energy efficiency across 
consumer and industrial sectors.13  
METI has outlined two comprehensive energy independence targets by the years 
2030 and 2050. By setting realistic near-term and medium-term goals, Japan is able to 
rationalize milestones and isolate policy responses needed to achieve each of them. 
Forecasting future energy demands inherently faces uncertainties of technological change, 
inter-technology cost competition as a byproduct of innovation, and an intensified 
competition between domestic firms and international firms to secure profitability. By 
2030, METI aims to achieve a considerable reduction in GHG emissions by using a 
comprehensive and diverse energy portfolio. For the 2030 milestones, a renewable energy 
portfolio requires laying the foundations of operating renewables as an adequate and 
reliable power source by investing in cost reduction and solving system constraints.14 For 
a safe and reliable nuclear power industry, a recurring comprehensive safety inspection and 
report is required to restore public faith in fission thermal power generation, simultaneously 
encouraging investment into developing safer technologies, as nuclear power should 
become a significant cornerstone of complete decarbonisation for long-term energy 
independence for Japan.  
                                                 
13 John S. Duffield, Fuels Paradise: Seeking Energy Security in Europe, Japan, and the United States 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 202–203. 
14 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 13–14. 
8 
For 2050, METI’s goal to reduce GHG emissions is significantly more ambitious 
than 2030, striving for a complete decarbonisation of major sectors of the economy. To 
achieve this goal, METI understands that a fundamental pivot away from fossil fuels will 
be required. Specifically, renewable energy must be an independent, reliable, and 
economically efficient primary power source. A safe and effective nuclear fleet 
strategically located throughout the island to serve the needs of the Japanese people will 
also be required. Nuclear energy is an important medium-term alternative to aid a full-scale 
economy-wide decarbonisation. One of the most common challenges associated with 
regional energy security is power distribution and storage systems, and are likely to 
intensify with increased independence from fossil fuels that currently supports Japan’s 
infrastructure. Japan’s 2050 energy goals will require large investment into research and 
development, upgrading infrastructure to support an energy economy in transition, 
embracing uncertainty and emerging technology, and unyielding financial support to 
achieve them.15   
There are two wide-ranging categories of energy technologies under debate to help 
Japan meet its energy security: renewables energy including wind, solar, geothermal, 
hydro, and to a lesser extent biological fuels as well as an advanced nuclear reactor fleet. 
Before 2011, Japan was only marginally self-sufficient in its overall energy requirements. 
It was labeled with one of the highest risk indices of an Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations in the world.16 Learning from the oil 
supply shocks of the 1970s, METI had started to invest in renewable power, mainly solar, 
via their Sunshine Program. Japan’s geography is prone to earthquakes, and thus legitimate 
concerns of safety are unavoidable with nuclear power. The LDP, led by Shinzo Abe 
recognizes nuclear power as a viable solution, although the commercialization of solar and 
                                                 
15 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 115–122. 
16 Frank Umbach, “The Energy Security of Japan after Fukushima 3/11,” in the Political Economy of 
Renewable Energy and Energy Security. Common Challenges and National Responses in Japan, China, 
and Northern Europe, ed. Espen Moe and Paul Midford (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 47. 
9 
wind power is relatively easier to sell to the public after Fukushima Daiichi.17 A 
combination of both policies will help advance Japan’s energy future.  
Prior to the Fukushima nuclear accident, nuclear thermal power generation 
provided a significant percentage of the overall energy production. Japan had intended to 
continue scaling nuclear power to offset rising demand and reduce import dependency. 
Immediately after the accident, utilities were forced to rely on traditional fuel sources with 
higher import costs, leading to Japan’s first ever trade deficit since 1980 with an overall 
import cost rising to 25.2%.18 As Hayashi and Hughes explain, a rapid and sudden shift 
away from nuclear power for Japan is unlikely, even with the significant opposition from 
the public. Such opposition is likely to fade in the future, as the exporting of nuclear power 
technology remains an important basis of economic growth for Japan; however, it presents 
a unique opportunity to incorporate renewable energy into the Japanese energy portfolio.19  
The thermal generation capacity lost after the Fukushima accident has been 
progressively replaced by Liquid Natural Gas (LNG). The easy substitution and availability 
of LNG make it an attractive alternative, even though it works against the climate policy 
goals set by METI. In the six months following the Fukushima accident, the consumption 
of LNG rose by nearly 25.9%, and Japan’s LNG imports were 7.8 million tons, nearly a 
13.5% increase compared to previous year’s consumption.20 Natural gas storage and 
transport require an intricate infrastructure and technological capacity to re-gasify the 
liquefied gas before use. LNG is a reliable fuel source and has seen increased use across 
Japan in both industrial and commercial applications. There are no pipelines connecting 
the importing of natural gas into Japan, and it is all done by specialized cargo ships 
requiring advanced docking terminals. LNG also has the lowest carbon emissions of all 
                                                 
17 Stephen Stapczynski and Chisaki Watanabe, “Japan Court Allows Nuclear Reactor to Reopen in 
Boost to Abe’s Energy Push,” Bloomberg Business, last modified September 24, 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/japan-court-rules-shikoku-electric-can-restart-
nuclear-reactor. 
18 Vivoda, 136. 
19 Masatsugu Hayashi and Larry Hughes, “The Policy Responses to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
and Their Effect on Japanese Energy Security,” Energy Policy 59, (August 2013): 97, 
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20 Hayashi and Hughes, 92. 
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fossil fuels, and hence, is an attractive option to supplement traditional and renewable 
energy sources to meet rising demand. Since the Fukushima accident, METI has classified 
“natural gas as an intermediate power source, which can be produced by low cost next to 
baseload power source, whose power output can respond quickly and flexibly to the 
situation of electricity demand.”21 
Japan is technologically sophisticated enough and capable of integrating renewable 
energy sources within their utilities; however, the required structural changes for mass-
scale adaptation have not reached a vested interest and the required cost-efficiencies within 
the energy markets, argues Moe.22 The infrastructure required to incorporate reliable solar 
power is drastically different from one required to integrate wind power into existing 
systems. Solar panels have the added benefit of integrating direct consumer markets into 
the categorical system, whereas large-scale wind power generation requires regulated 
industries in specific geographies with its associated environmental concerns.  
Wind power is a credible alternative for Japan. Although highly dependent on 
location and weather conditions, offshore windfarms integrated into the Japanese energy 
market have the potential to serve densely populated areas of Japan. While land availability 
in Japan is limited, offshore wind farms carry an enormous potential to contribute to 
Japan’s energy future. Again, as an intermediate energy source to base load demands, 
combined with the technical and manufacturing expertise of the Japanese industry, a 
utilization rate of 50% is achievable, generating nearly 10 gigawatt (GW).23 Consistent 
with the United Nations Conference of Parties (COP21) pledge, METI has outlined a 
strategy to achieve Japan’s overall energy needs from renewable sources as much as 
practically possible. A combination of capital market and regulatory reforms should allow 
Japan to generate 159 GW by 2030 from offshore wind farms alone to service highly 
                                                 
21 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 20. 
22 Espen Moe, “The Energy Security of Japan after Fukushima 3/11,” in the Political Economy of 
Renewable Energy and Energy Security. Common Challenges and National Responses in Japan, China, 
and Northern Europe, ed. Espen Moe and Paul Midford (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 280. 
23 Buckley and Nicholas, 3.  
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specific coastal areas on the eastern edge, where the threat of another tsunami remains 
credible.24  
Achieving energy security is a complicated policy and technical matter for Japan. 
It requires a complete and comprehensive buy-in from all the stakeholders. For a free-
market economy like Japan, reforms must be market oriented. Energy producers will need 
incentives to develop new cost-effective technologies and merge them with the economies 
of scale to reduce the overall cost of adaptation for consumers. The Government of Japan 
(GOJ) will need to act as an intermediary and to provide adequate regulatory compliance 
guidance to meet its 2030 and 2050 energy security goals. This research will largely deal 
with the economics of energy security with very limited political science influence unless 
necessary. 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Most promising solutions to Japan’s energy security would ideally come from a 
robust and dynamic combination of an advanced nuclear reactor fleet for thermal power 
generation coupled with sustainable generation sources when they are geographically and 
environmentally significant in the region in which they are utilized. Japan’s unique 
geography will require unique policy recommendations for each region. Some parts of 
Japan have a more efficient solar radiation map than others, wind patterns are more easily 
mapped in some parts and easily mechanized in others. With Fukushima’s history looming 
clear on policy makers, nuclear power would be better suited in areas less prone to 
earthquakes and tsunamis. Lastly, for renewable resources, proximity to transmission lines 
and infrastructure available for power integration and storage is key. Given the anxiety and 
the suppression of nuclear-power use after the Fukushima Daichii accident in 2011, 
rebuilding the public trust with extensive safety inspections and transparent government 
oversight is critical to incorporate nuclear technology as a core element of Japan’s long-
term energy stability.  
                                                 
24 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 48. 
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Many political and industry leaders believe removing nuclear power plants from 
operation will substantially raise energy costs and further slide Japan into an economic 
slowdown. However, during many public hearings, Japanese citizens often displayed 
significant support to suspend nuclear power generation in Japan. For the people of Japan, 
“The unmistakable theme of the hearings was mistrust of the government’s ability to 
oversee nuclear safety.”25 However, Japan is unwilling to part with nuclear power. The 
Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) of Japan, created after Fukushima, is charged with 
tighter regulation of the industry in an effort to restore public confidence.  
Second, an extensive infrastructure upgrade investment will need to supplement the 
recommendations of the energy policy. Improvements to the power grid, transmission 
systems, and control systems to manage dynamic power fluctuations rising from renewable 
sources will need to be integrated across all sectors. In the short-term, Japan must reduce 
the dependence on foreign oil and fossil fuel sources, while gradually increasing the 
integration of LNG into the Japanese industrial and consumer economy at market prices 
since large-scale use infrastructure currently does not exist in Japan. Even though Japan 
currently boasts the highest energy efficiency of any nation, a significant gain in the 
transportation industry with the introduction of electric vehicles should considerably 
reduce the demand for fossil fuels. In the medium to long-term, Japan must recognize the 
importance, safety, and reliability of nuclear power and use it as leverage to reach full 
energy security in combination with renewable sources. Market led incentives provided to 
both consumers and industry to increase mass-adaptation would accelerate the 
independence from fossil fuels while achieving energy security and meeting the climate 
change GHG reduction goals simultaneously.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this thesis, various energy sources will be explored and evaluated for their 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. An analysis of the current state of use for 
                                                 
25 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan, Under Pressure, Backs Off Goal to Phase Out Nuclear Power by 2040,” 
New York Times, September 12, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/japan-backs-off-
of-goal-to-phase-out-nuclear-power-by-2040.html. 
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energy sources will be determined within the Japanese economy. This study will include 
an analysis of various fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewables programs and 
recommendations currently implemented. A qualitative and analytical evaluation method 
for each sector will be considered separately as outlined below. The overall goal for the 
Japanese government is to provide a robust, reliable, affordable consumption, cost-
effective generation, and an environmentally sustainable energy supply to all sectors of the 
economy while raising energy efficiency standards throughout the economy. This two-
prong approach should suppress demand while shoring up the supply chain within the 
Japanese energy market structure.  
To answer the research question of overall energy reassurance and self-sufficiency, 
this thesis research has the five overarching goals first. First, to identify, describe, and 
comparatively analyze the stated energy market reform goals of the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI). Second, to determine if the prescribed policy reforms are 
appropriate to shift the energy focus away from heavy hydrocarbons dependence to 
economy-wide respite from import dependence. Third, this thesis will also consider 
whether Japan’s climate goals are consistent with the international agreements, designed 
to combat anthropogenic climate change. Fourth, given the diverse landscape of Japan and 
modern technological capacity for innovation, evaluate economic policy recommendations 
for alleviating market saturation, time lag for adoption, and sophisticated challenges such 
as an overhaul of current power generation-delivery nexus. Finally, this analysis will also 
consider an overarching reality of changing demographics of Japan, specifically an aging 
population, which must be considered to provide affordable energy security in order to 
reduce the intertemporal per capita burden to access energy.  
The identification of Japan’s energy policy and strategy is derived from the 
documents produced by METI and ANRE. This is the most obvious, consistent, and 
approved means of analyzing Japan’s energy strategy. It contains an extensive synthesis, 
legislative priorities, trade-off considerations, and an overall policy agenda Japanese 
politics allows. METI and ANRE most recently updated the Fifth Strategic Energy Plan in 
July 2018 for public consumption, which lays out the guidelines for the markets to operate 
in. Its unstated and nuanced goals to be achieved will be analyzed in conjunction with 
14 
academic sources, global think tanks, as well as scholarly journals that evaluate the efficacy 
and viability of Japan’s policies as a regionally significant economy in East Asia.  
The effectiveness of the Japan’s policy recommendations must be evaluated in 
terms of their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT analysis) to 
understand the time-horizon in which Japan is trying to realize its goals. The SWOT 
analysis will undertake energy security as a single case study; however, each sector is given 
its own due consideration. For example, nuclear fuel safety is a critical component of 
nuclear power, whereas ecological consideration is critical for sustainability. In a broad 
scope, major themes for current and future energy posture and their relative viability of 
integration are considered for hydrocarbons, nuclear power, and renewables. In measuring 
the feasibility of the stated policy objective of each fuel source, economic trade-offs, 
opportunity costs, and political constraints will be presented to the reader if applicable. 
This will allow a rational determination of which strategies are the most effective and 
which are the most probable. In a democratic country like Japan, the diversity of ideas often 
results in conflicts and a moderate solution is often produced to advance a political agenda. 
Since METI has two distinct goals by 2030 and 2050, an assessment will be offered on the 
likelihood of meeting those binding goals.  
Japan is one of the United States’ more staunch allies in East Asia. It is necessary 
to comment on how Japanese energy security is beneficial to the state security of Japan, 
and ultimately beneficial to the United States. Rapid expansion of the Chinese domestic 
economy and its quest to achieve energy supply security as a matter of state objective 
further underscores Japan’s energy insecurity. In this pursuit, scholarly sources such as 
energy transition journal articles, newspapers like the New York Times, professional 
organizations like the International Energy Association (IEA), or Bloomberg Business 
Analytics that comment on the combination of energy policy, international relations, and 
security studies will be consulted. While Japan has a broad energy policy portfolio, this 
thesis research will not comment or evaluate Japanese policy against other states. Japan is 
a unique country with unique energy needs, and a comparison to China or South Korea will 
almost certainly not be commensurate. This research will show that given the geographic 
isolation of Japan, it must undertake a radically different and innovative policy reforms. 
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Since Japan cannot physically connect its supply chain to another country in Asia right 
now, its energy transition is rooted in altering economic preferences and mounting 
technical progress to substitute traditional energy portfolios. As an advanced economy in 
the region, and a country that exports technology throughout the world, Japanese energy 
policy can be used as a state tool to influence economic security outcomes. Energy security 
for Japan is a time-sensitive matter, and Japan must take steps now to reduce foreign 
dependence and develop domestic energy production infrastructure in order to achieve 
stable, reliable, and cost-efficient energy supplies in order to maintain its economic 











The fossil fuel-based energy supply comprises the largest share of energy 
availability in Japan. A common measurement to readily display the scarcity has been 
adopted in this research. It is called Japan’s energy Self-Sufficiency Ratio (SSR). It 
explains the total primary energy necessary for all lifestyles and economic activities. In a 
comparison of total primary source availability (including coal, crude oil, natural gas, 
nuclear power, hydro-electric power, and renewable resources combined), Japan’s 2018 
SSR was a mere 9.6% compared to, for example, Norway at 792.6% and Australia at 
306.0% because of their abundance of domestic energy resources.26 With one of the lowest 
ratios among OECD countries, Japan’s energy security is vulnerable due to extreme 
dependence on exporting countries.27 In East Asia, the demand for a diversified fossil fuel 
portfolio is strong. The Japanese and the Chinese economies are voracious consumers of 
energy. China is able to extract resources from its vast landmass whereas Japan lacks such 
advantage. Prior to March 2011, Japan heavily relied on imports and the Fukushima 
accident simply exacerbated the energy imbalance. As Figure 1 shows, Japan’s net energy 
imports rose sharply immediately after the Fukushima incident in 2011. 
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Economy, Trade and Industry, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, June 2019, 
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Figure 1. Net energy imports, percentage of energy use in Japan from 
available data, 1965–2015.28 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) country brief labels Japan as 
the largest liquefied natural gas importer (LNG), and fourth in the world for coal and 
petroleum imports.29 EIA goes on to mention that  
in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear incident, Japan’s energy fuel mix 
shifted as natural gas, oil, and renewable energy now provide larger shares 
and supplant some of the nuclear fuel. Oil remains the largest source of 
primary energy in Japan, although its share of total energy consumption has 
declined from about 80% in the 1970s to 42% in 2015.30  
Within the hydrocarbon category, the relative dependence on energy imports 
remain high, but the combination imports have shifted depending on the global market 
forces and Japan’s commitment to reduce GHG emissions to meet the carbon dioxide cap 
                                                 
28 Adapted from “Energy Imports, net (% of energy use) —Japan, United States,” The World Bank, 
accessed October 18, 2019, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS?end=2015&locations=JP-
US&start=1960&view=chart. 
29 “Country Analysis Brief: Japan,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 2, 2017, 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Japan/japan.pdf. 
30 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2.  
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set at both the Kyoto Protocol and most recently at Paris climate accords. Figure 2 
illustrates how the energy supply landscape in Japan has shifted over the years. The sharp 
decline in nuclear power is noteworthy after 2010, as it was readily substituted by LNG 
and coal.  
 
Figure 2. Trends in composition of primary energy supply of Japan.31 
                                                 
31 Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 
2. 
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Japan has navigated a careful resource diplomacy strategy to ensure its energy 
demands are met efficiently and at a reasonable cost given its 4.037 million barrels of oil 
consumption per day, the fourth highest in the world.32 Despite foreign policy pressures, 
Japan has managed to maintain a diversified network of imports from various countries. In 
2018, top crude oil suppliers to Japan were as follows: Saudi Arabia at 38.6% and United 
Arab Emirates at 25.4%, followed by Qatar at 7.9% and Kuwait at 7.7% of the total 1.1 
billion barrels imported; in importing LNG, Japan relied on Australia at 34.6%, Malaysia 
at 13.6%, Qatar at 12.0%, and Russia at 8.1% followed by various others; and lastly for 
coal imports to Japan, the vast majority of them come from Australia at 71.5% followed 
by Indonesia at 11.8%.33 Japan’s Resource diplomacy’s top objective is “securing the flow 
of oil and facilitating concession agreement extensions and signing of new production 
sharing contracts (PSC).”34 
Japan’s excessive dependence on hydrocarbons has concerned the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) since the 1960s. METI has since teamed up with 
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) to develop policy proposals that will enhance and strengthen hydrocarbon supply 
resiliency. Both agencies are engaged in a concerted effort to raise Japan’s self-
development and production ratio (SDR)35 by providing financial incentives for national 
oil projects (mainly by Japan Gas, Oil, and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), Japan 
National Oil Corporation (JNOC), and Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC) 
government agencies) for off-shore and overseas exploration of hydrocarbon resources.36 
Additionally, both vertical and horizontal consolidation have been encouraged to leverage 
bargaining power of companies and increase market-driven competitiveness because of the 
                                                 
32  “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” BP, June 2017, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-
country/de_ch/PDF/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017-full-report.pdf.” 
33  Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2. 
34 Loftur Thorarinsson, A Review of the Evolution of the Japanese Oil Industry, Oil Policy and its 
Relationship with the Middle East, Report No. OIES PAPER: WPM 76 (Oxford, UK: Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, 2018), https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784671020. 
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36 Thorarinsson, 5–13. 
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fragmentation of the domestic industry comprised of independent actors with competing 
interests. Given the volatility of the commodity and numerous international factors, Vivoda 
explains:  
Japan has been a key participant in the zero-sum competition among Asian 
oil importers, particularly since the emergence of China as a major oil 
importer in the early 1990s. These interrelated challenges stem from the 
Japanese government’s treatment of oil as a strategic commodity, which is 
not surprising given that Japan remains almost exclusively reliant on oil 
imports and given the country’s experience during the 1970s oil crises.37 
METI has developed an ambitious future policy proposal that is designed to elevate 
Japan’s energy security, increase resiliency by diversifying its portfolio, and reduce 
dependence on imported oil while meeting carbon dioxide reduction goals outlined in 
global climate change action agreements.  
B. AMBITIONS 
Japan’s Fifth Strategic Energy Plan document seeks to make structural changes to 
the energy requirements within Japan’s economy with staggered achievement goals for 
2030 and 2050. To meet these goals, improving energy efficiency is key across all 
industrial and commercial sectors that rely on fossil fuels. The overall population growth 
trend in Japan is negative, and thus developing concentrated hubs of energy consumption 
in urban areas will provide dual benefits: enable affordable access by reducing supply costs 
over a longer geographic distance and reduce environmental risk externalities. METI’s plan 
seeks to reduce hydrocarbon energy demand associated with lifestyle and economic 
activity and replace it with technological innovation without compromising power density. 
By 2030, Japan has pledged to reduce its GHG emissions by 26% (which is approximately 
1.042 billion tons) compared to 2013 levels in an effort to reduce fossil dependence in their 
energy mix.38  
                                                 
37 Vivoda, 70. 
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Japan has agreed to major international and intergovernmental pacts in reducing 
GHG emissions in an effort to combat climate change. Divesting from fossil fuels will 
require a concerted effort among all industrial and commercial partners. The Fifth Strategic 
Energy Plan document aims for an effective government energy policy designed to balance 
the energy trilemma to ensure access and reliability while meeting environmental 
protection goals Japan has signed on to as outlined in Figure 3. Additionally, Figure 4 
displays the trajectory of Japan’s emissions since the 1990s. Under these collective 
agreements (Paris Agreement, Copenhagen Accords, and Kyoto Protocol),  
Japan will lead the international community under the Paris Agreement so 
that major greenhouse gas (GHG)-emitting countries will undertake the 
reduction of their emissions under a fair and effective international 
framework in which all major countries participate and will aim at the long-
term goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 while 
reconciling global warming countermeasures and economic growth.39 
 
Figure 3. Japan’s agreements to reduce greenhouse emissions.40 
                                                 
39 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 108. 




Figure 4. Historical view of Japan’s emissions projections.41 
Japan’s ambitious energy policy is classified under the 3E + S framework. It includes 
energy security, economic efficiency, environmental suitability, and safety.42 The desired 
energy mix in 2030 is comprised of 27% LNG, 26% coal, and less than 5% oil, while the rest 
supplemented by renewable sources.43 METI has planned to work with the Japanese business 
sector to liberalize production and delivery energy markets. METI is careful to balance 
industrial and commercial use to ensure a desirable energy mix going forward. Japan has 
pledged to go even further to build energy resiliency. Japan’s cabinet under the government of 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has adopted a plan to go carbon-neutral soon after 2050, with 
largescale introduction of advanced Carbon Capture, Storage, and Utilization (CCU) 
technologies to support such goal.44 A high degree of energy trilemma attainment is the highest 
common denominator for Japan. A trilemma score of AAA in all three categories is ideal. 
Figure 5 clearly shows that Japan is an effective in ensuring energy equity with 100% 
electrification across the population, but has some structural issues to resolve stemming from 
high import dependence and its associated GHG emissions.  
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42 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 118. 
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Figure 5. The 2018 Japan trilemma index rankings and balance score.45 
C. PETROLEUM 
Japan’s petroleum refining infrastructure is quite robust, as shown in Figure 6; 
however, it is rarely used at peak capacity.  
 
Figure 6. Japan’s oil refineries and their production capacities.46 
Energy security is rooted in the diversity of the supply chain. A multilayer, 
diversified network that is capable of appropriate elasticity during times of high 
uncertainty, crisis, and routine fluctuations in the demand matrix is ideal. Japan has taken 
                                                 
45 Source: “Country Profile: Japan,” World Energy Council, accessed October 19, 2019, 
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steps toward accomplishing this goal by seeking production contracts, joint ventures on 
resource exploration, and by partly shifting the geographic focus from which it obtains 
natural resources. While the Middle East remains a hub for Japanese crude oil imports, 
Southeast Asia has become an increasingly strategic supplier of energy resources for Japan. 
Vivoda underscores the importance of supplier diversity by highlighting that, “Should one 
supplier fall victim to natural disasters, terrorism, war, regime change, or other export-
damaging events, importers will only experience minor disruptions to their total supply.”47 
Japan understood that a comprehensive energy security must include an efficient demand 
management strategy, a technique in which “Japan seeks to leverage its comparative 
advantage in energy efficiency to further reduce its energy intensity.”48 The competition 
of resources from the emerging economies in the region make energy supply a zero-sum 
proposition for Japan. Even so, oil remains a flexible means with large stockpiles. It is 
scalable to various sectors and will remain an important source of energy throughout 
Japan’s economy during its energy transition. METI’s policy direction has classified oil as 
a resource of last resort to promote energy development and to achieve a multilayer 
portfolio but has refused to exclude it outright. 
Japan unsurprisingly has consistently earned an “A” in energy equity, a 
multidimensional issue. The social stability and economic benefits generated from reliable 
physical availability and affordable energy access are high. Access is instrumental to the 
overall welfare of citizens. Reducing barriers to entry and promoting open market 
competition has been a key part of Japan’s energy policy to expand access and reduce cost 
for the end-user. In the Electricity Review of Japan, a report published by the Federation 
of Electric Power Companies of Japan, 100 percent of Japanese residents have access to 
reliable electric power generated from thermal sources.49 Within the trilemma, only 
realistic advancements in energy equity can occur by reducing the probability of blackouts 
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https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007177. 
48 Vivoda and Manicom, 231. 
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and brownouts and improving the power transmission infrastructure to reduce the cost of 
transporting electricity. In Zhang’s analysis, he writes that a high level of penetration of 
substitute technologies in place of oil and coal are compulsory to maintain existing levels 
of energy access and equity while reducing carbon dioxide levels as required.50  
The United States and Japan are strong allies bounded by a security guarantee 
against threats in the region. Their economic and security interdependence often makes it 
difficult for Japan to be completely independent of the American influence in its resource 
resiliency. The weakness in the Japanese energy security actually stems from Japan’s 
inability to make completely independent geopolitical decisions. Japan cannot 
commercially interact with regimes that either are at odds with Washington or are 
economically sanctioned. Broadly speaking, within the Fifth Strategic Energy Plan, Japan 
strives to reduce its dependence on the Middle East in terms of total energy consumption 
due to the substitution of LNG; however, for crude oil, Japan is still vulnerable to energy 
shocks originating from that region, a significant threat to energy security. 
Act on the Rational Use of Energy enacted in 1978, also known as the Energy 
Conservation Act, mandates that all sectors ratify efficiency measures to assist in the 
national policy of energy security while improving affordability and access across the 
population. It is amended often to keep in line with strategic energy security goals. The 
latest revision proposal in 2016 includes thermal power generation facility efficiency 
standards upgrades for effective utilization of heat.51 A continuous opportunity to improve 
energy security exists within Japan’s immense efficiency capability. An interesting 
intersectional threat exists nested within this opportunity for more efficient use of energy. 
China’s access to the global reserves of oil are larger than that of Japan simply due to the 
Chinese aversion of rules and norms of the international community. China routinely 
conducts business with states that are sanctioned by the western industrialized economies. 
In direct competition with China, Japan will most certainly lose a race for resources; 
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however, strategic political cooperation could raise energy security of Japan. Vivoda 
underscores the importance of supply diversification and explains that 
Japan effectively needs Chinese acquiescence to gain direct access to 
Central Asian oil, while China continues to need assistance in improving 
energy efficiency…. cooperating with China for access to global resources, 
in exchange for assistance with energy efficiency technologies, should have 
resonance in Tokyo. This could lead to a way out of the zero-sum 
perspective in a region where there is little tangible cooperation on energy 
security [in 2019].52 
The added factor of a population decline reduces the pressure on the Japanese 
government to act or collaborate with China and successful technological efficiency gains 
domestically make it even less likely they Tokyo will do so. METI’s current energy policy 
directive is lukewarm at the idea of a Sino-Japanese collaboration due to the political 
distrust between the two. Tokyo would rather direct national resources towards 
independent oil exploration to raise the domestic SDR and energy-related technological 
development. The overlapping territorial claims in the East China Sea (ECS) over 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) make direct cooperation unlikely since the energy 
security linkages directly extend to national security. Herberg writes, “This struggle for 
Asian mastery fuses energy security with regional geopolitics and is reflected in 
intensifying disputes over territorial sovereignty in the South and East China Seas between 
China and neighboring states [especially Japan, the most militarily capable].”53 
Japan currently maintains 36 thermal generation power plants, connecting the 
national trunk line power grid at either 500kV or 154–275 kV.54 In 2013, Japan consumed 
966.6 billion kWh of actual electrical energy, accounting for approximately 1.7% annual 
economic growth, and Japan is aiming to consume 1,278 billion kWh of energy by 2030.55 
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Through innovative conservation methods and energy-efficient improvements, Japanese 
energy policy calls to lower the importance of petroleum based thermal power generation 
and lower consumption by either direct reduction or via a substitution of more sustainable 
resources to achieve trilemma maximization. ANRE’s energy transition methods are 
aiming to increase the energy self-sufficiency ratio and create a composition 
of power sources that is resistant to changes in international oil prices, the 
government of Japan is working to stabilize electricity rates by promoting 
competition between business operators through the full liberalization of the 
electricity retail market that was started in FY 2016.56 
The vast majority of imported crude oil is refined within Japan as a cost-effective 
measure to reduce the costs that are passed on to the consumer. According to the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s 2017 World Fact Book, Japan produces approximately 384 
thousand barrels of crude oil per day, compared to the consumption rate of nearly 4 million 
barrels per day.57 Immediately after the negative public sentiment of the Fukushima crisis, 
Japan shut down its nuclear power generation fleet and began to rely solely on fossil fuel 
energy, throwing the trilemma in to a state of chaos. Lain Wilson of Bloomberg notes, “To 
fill the hole, Japan turned to gas and oil. In 2013, a mere two years after Fukushima, Japan 
was generating 42 percent of its electricity from gas, while oil accounted for 15 percent 
and coal 31 percent.”58 The Fukushima accident inflicted a high cost of short-term energy 
import on Japan because of the tightly linked global oil supply that was slow to respond to 
a change in demand. As a direct result, the cost of electricity and transport across Japan 
increased rapidly. Electrical rates have risen nearly 30% for industrial users and 20% for 
consumer users, adding 1.8 trillion yen in surcharge to the downstream end-user 
consumption cost.59 
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With the sweeping changes in the energy sector implemented, the overall oil 
demand in Japan has been declining and is projected to drop below 2.5 million barrels per 
day interchanged by substitute products in energy production, according to the Oxford 
Institute of Energy Studies.60 As innovation displaces dated energy production and use 
practices, Japan is poised to expand energy access and affordability by engaging in 
extensive research and development of disruptive technologies. Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s book titled Energy: The Next Fifty 
Years, outlines the overall approach as, “Japan’s survival strategy in a constrained 
economic environment: substitute a constraint-free production factor such as technology 
for a constrained one such as energy.”61 
As Japan’s demographics shift, it is possible that per capita energy use will decline. 
Figure 7 shows the projected demand for traditional sources if the status quo is maintained 
while absorbing the negative opportunity cost of the foregone innovation. Development of 
highly technical and sophisticated technologies may very well be energy intensive in the 
production phase before they are able to return a net-positive energy independence.  
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Figure 7. Japan’s oil demand forecast through 2030.62 
In Japan, stockpiling of oil resources began in the 1970s to reduce supply shocks to 
the economy. This practice is still widely in use today. In addition to the strategic resources 
for national security, Japan has maintained an oil stockpiling target as determined by METI 
and ANRE and as required by the Oil Stockpiling Act of 1975. The Japanese government 
and private companies are explicitly required to hold stockpiles, approximately 208 days 
of domestic consumption, which amounts to approximately 80 million kiloliters of oil.63 
As part of the negotiated contracts and soft diplomacy, Japan also maintains some reserves 
with petroleum-producing nations to further safeguard its supply and bolster energy 
security, consistent with their strategy. 
Aiding the quest for energy security in Japan is its modern, well-developed, 
adaptive, and scalable network of infrastructure. The mesh network of delivery and 
transport system is engineered to survive many decades even with the frequency of seismic 
activity in the region. METI’s multi-layer approach includes comprehensive upgrades to 
utilities infrastructure to deliver a resilient network in support of the end-user. 
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Interconnected infrastructure with another state is unfortunately not an option for Japan at 
this time, unlike Germany or France. Market transactions in buying and selling power 
based on peak or adjusted demand significantly limits Japan in achieving energy security 
in the electrical power generation sector. Thus, it has become essential for Japan to 
establish and maintain a robust energy support infrastructure for access and affordability 
to elevate the trilemma score as defined by the World Energy Council and WETI. Jansen 
and Van der Welle write that 
to ensure “energy security,” most policymakers tend to content themselves 
by and large with two major activities. These are: (1) standard energy 
infrastructure planning and plan realization, and (2) diversification of fuel 
sourcing and fuel transport routing to hedge against resource concentration 
as their main supply security concerns.64 
Energy transport infrastructure can be considered a public good even though the 
case for hard action in favor of public infrastructure investment in energy markets is 
complex. Given the nature of Japan’s geography, public policy options to accommodate 
energy access, affordability, and transport require regional solutions, which are being dealt 
with by Japan in a limited extent. One such aspect, the reliability dimension the energy 
transition, advocates for a resilient infrastructure to which Japan’s construction industries 
are responding. Insuring against acts of terrorism and preventing energy delivery 
bottlenecks should further stabilize market volatility.  
Reliable electrical access is key to ensuring a high quality of life for citizens and 
maintaining a favorable economic landscape in the economy as in whole. As an OECD 
country, Japan’s Human Development Index is quite high, 0.909 to be exact, ranked 19th 
worldwide.65 The Fukushima accident suddenly removed the nuclear power source for 
electricity generation, approximately 30 gigawatts, or about 17.3%, of Japan’s total 
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capacity,66 which required petroleum-based power generation sources to adjust to dynamic 
demand, raising electricity prices in face of a reduced supply. METI’s 3E+S energy policy 
specifically calls for the separation of transmission and distribution markets from electrical 
generation markets to provide consumers greater access while fostering innovation and 
competition to lower overall cost of electricity.67 Chapman and Itaoka identify four key 
mechanisms of Japan’s potential pathway to transition—transformation, reconfiguration, 
technological substitution, and de-alignment/realignment—to achieve higher energy 
security and a balanced trilemma.68 A fully liberalized market supports price-signaling 
mechanisms to promote investment based on consumer preferences. In Japan, these are 
reduced price volatility, transparency of costs, and price/service competition among 
companies with a focus on environmentally sustainable power generation. 
The multi-layered energy transition of Japan is benefiting from the guidance of the 
energy policies outlined by the government. The abolition of regional monopolies on the 
consumer side and creation of wholesale power market exchanges with increased oversight 
on power grid neutrality in the high-rate supply areas are key for systemic reforms. 
Competing open market demands are unlikely to be met by the market alone, especially 
because the industry is risk-averse in responding to changes in the population location and 
concentration throughout Japan. Government policy is reducing the influence of exogenous 
variables in the prospective energy transition decision making, encouraging a rapid 
transition away from conventional fuel sources, but the transition will likely still require 
significant behavioral change leading to a large-scale adaption of alternate energy sources 
to meet energy security goals of 2030 and 2050. 
Energy source mix dictates the requirements of the infrastructure. After the 
Fukushima accident, much of the nuclear infrastructure became underutilized and the 
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demand pressure was transferred to the petroleum-supported sector. Japan’s industrial 
strength in the infrastructure construction and development sector is supporting energy 
transition. METI’s policy guidance suggests a need to not only replace aging infrastructure 
but also enact large-scale capital spending projects 
for constructing power transmission and distribution networks that can 
adapt to the different power generation time zones and power output 
characteristics of various energy sources as well as for taking measures to 
enhance the stability of power grids, including the installation of load 
following power sources and storage batteries.69 
The energy landscape is clearly changing in Japan. The qualitative review of the 
energy trilemma is moving in the positive direction to further reinforce Japan’s energy 
strategy and policy. The overall focus of the oil-dependent transport, residential, 
commercial, and industrial sectors is to reduce their dependency. It can be accomplished 
via diversification, innovation, and energy efficiency upgrades to meet the consumer 
demand while attaining goals designed to combat climate change. A shift in the 
consumption behavior of petroleum resources is critical to Japan’s survival in the changing 
geopolitical landscape. Japan’s shrinking population should soften the overall demand for 
petroleum goods and aiding energy security; however, vast majority of the improvements 
in the energy security will be realized from a systematic shift away from fossil fuels and 
utilization of alternate-source domestic energy production. Petroleum is deeply rooted in 
the Japanese economy as a relatively cost-effective baseline fuel used to power economic 
growth and socioeconomic progress. Even though Japan strives to become a net-zero 
emissions society after 2050, Japan will likely remain an importer of fossil fuels through 
2030 and 2050.   
D. NATURAL GAS 
While oil and coal-based power generation may provide relatively cheap electrical 
and thermal power generation, the appeal of natural gas as part of the energy security mix 
in Japan after Fukushima has been rising. As some coal-fired energy production plants are 
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being scrapped, BloombergNEF, an energy research firm, points out that many of Japan’s 
utility companies are replacing coal with natural gas, following the direction of Ministry 
of the Environment and METI. Earlier this year, Tokyo Gas, Idemitsu Kosan, and Kyushu 
Electric discarded their new coal power plant plans to study the feasibility and cost 
effectiveness of building LNG plants instead with a similar phenomenon occurring 
throughout the Japanese energy market to provide a stable and secure energy source.70 The 
firm further elaborates,  
While the Ministry of Environment has voiced concerns about carbon 
emissions from Japan’s coal-fired fleet, the decisions to scrap the plants 
[and replace it with LNG or other less volatile sources] are also being driven 
by economics. Gross electricity demand in Japan is expected to drop from 
1,075 terawatt-hours today to 1,010 terawatt-hours in 2030, BNEF 
estimated in July.71 
LNG is considered a bridge fuel because of its ability to assist base-load power 
generation. LNG’s integration in to the Japanese energy market has been swift following 
the Fukushima accident. The cost of integration has been relatively high for Japan since it 
lacked the appropriate receipt, storage, re-gasification, and delivery infrastructure prior to 
Fukushima. Additionally, Japan lacked production contracts with suppliers overseas and 
the sudden influx of demand with the removal of the nuclear fleet disrupted energy market 
equilibrium. In an intense competition of energy resources with China and India, Japan 
opted to pay a premium market price to receive LNG quickly to provide reliable energy 
across all sectors of the economy.  
Outlined in the 2016 Strategy for LNG Market Development, Japan is aiming to 
achieve the following: “(1) improvement of the liquidity of the LNG trade, (2) 
establishment of an LNG price discovery mechanism reflecting supply and demand, and 
(3) open and sufficient infrastructure development.”72 The shale revolution in the 
industrial-scale extraction of LNG has shifted the global supply in a positive direction from 
which Japan can benefit. Innovation in drilling technology in the U.S., which has an 
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abundant shale natural gas, is reducing the cost of drilling and raising production rapidly. 
METI and ANRE recognize that “the export of the first LNG from the U.S. mainland in 
February 2016 was a key indicator that the shale revolution will affect the gas market 
worldwide. It is better for Japan to benefit from the decoupling of oil prices and gas prices 
by optimizing LNG transactions.”73 Figure 8 shows the infrastructure capacity in place to 
receive LNG and transmit it to the highly dense areas of Japan. 
 
Figure 8. Japan’s existing and planned LNG receiving infrastructure.74 
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Unfortunately, Japan’s domestic production of LNG will remain in a structural 
downturn due to the lack of strategic reserves within its own borders with limited, if any, 
realistic opportunity for commercialization and harvest of significant new discoveries 
underground. Fitch Solutions, a firm in the United Kingdom, predicts that “Japan will 
produce about 3.6 bcm [billion cubic meteres] of natural gas in 2019 then decline at an 
average rate of 5% per annum to reach 2.3 bcm by 2028. The chance of a major discovery 
with the potential to change the country’s gas production outlook over the coming years 
remains slim.”75 Even though METI has aimed at increasing Japan’s LNG SDR, it is 
unlikely to provide a domestic boost to reduce import dependency. LNG will remain an 
intermediate power source with a relatively cheap cost-basis to quickly respond to 
electricity demand as a substitute for oil. Fitch’s Oil and Gas report shows that 
Japan will rely on natural gas for about 40% of total power generation over 
the coming decade. This is despite newly reiterated government targets to 
lower this share to 27% by 2027 as the country aims to reduce its reliance 
on natural gas imports in order to reduce high retail electricity prices for 
consumers.76 
 
Figure 9. Japan’s LNG price trend, compared to global crude oil prices as a 
substitute good.77 
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Since 2012, Japan has hosted the LNG producers-consumers dialogue conference 
to ensure that the Japanese energy industry is able to meet the future energy security 
challenges. In an effort to the diversify energy mix and strengthen ties through resource 
diplomacy, Japan aims to bring together government leaders, industry professionals, heads 
of organizations, and various stakeholders to discuss mutual opportunities and challenges 
to reduce energy supply volatility. Organized by METI, the 8th Annual LNG producers-
consumers conference will be jointly hosted in Tokyo with Asia Pacific Energy Research 
Centre (APERC) to discuss the issues outlined in the Fifth Strategic Energy Plan. Overall 
targets of energy security with respect to LNG remain similar to that of oil for Japan. Japan 
wants to ensure an overall supply availability, a strong carbon emission reduction agenda 
to meet climate accord agreements, energy security as a part of an overall economic growth, 
safe and reliable energy supply throughout the country, efficient operation of energy 
markets, improvement in the SDR if possible, and lastly realignment of the LNG supply-
demand forces to support improvement in energy trilemma as outlined by METI in the 
strategic document.78 Figure 10 shows the forecasted supply trends in the LNG market. 
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Figure 10. Supply growth forecast, LNG by region through 2040.79 
LNG utilization provides direct substitution with oil. Combined with the market 
incentives to potentially lower operational costs and increase supply diversity in energy 
portfolio for Japanese companies, LNG remains a highly lucrative bridge fuel. While still 
a fossil fuel, its carbon dioxide footprint is lower than that of coal or heavy crude oil. LNG 
burning power generation plants are required to have a thermal efficiency of 44.3% or 
higher by 2030 as directed by the Act on Rational Use of Energy.80 LNG is considered a 
cleaner-burning fuel, hence the bridge fuel criteria is appropriate for LNG. The 3E+S 
energy policy underscores the importance of LNG as stated in METI’s strategic document. 
METI states that “[even] though Japan does not import natural gas through pipelines, the 
gas involves relatively low geopolitical risk compared to oil and emits the least amount of 
greenhouse gases among fossil fuels. Therefore, natural gas plays the central role as an 
intermediate power source.”81 Competitive pricing negotiations with producers in 
Southeast Asia and North America will allow Japan to lower procurement costs 
substantially. Lifting destination restraints and providing financial incentives for Japanese 
companies to explore LNG offshore and in the Sea of Japan are boosting interest in the 
extensive development of a flexible and responsive LNG market.  
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Diversification of suppliers is a core driver of the LNG market stability for Japan 
to reduce the “Asian Premium.”82 A flourishing shale and natural gas market in North 
America is a boon for Japan’s prospect for leveraging LNG as its strategic source of energy 
while reducing geopolitical uncertainty with its suppliers. Japan has embarked on a unique 
cooperation with the United States to expand LNG market access, increase investment for 
scaled future demand, and essentially guarantee stability in this partnership. The attempted 
pivot away from the imported Middle Eastern suppliers in the oil markets nicely 
complements LNG market opportunities in Japan. According to U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s export data, “Japanese companies are considering further investments in U.S. 
power plants and gas liquefaction export facilities. Such infrastructure investors would 
again, include, electric and gas utilities, as well as major trading companies, who said 
recently they will increase their LNG production capacity by 60% by 2020.”83 
The U.S.-Japan joint statement on energy development, signed in November 2018, 
reaffirmed a strong economic interdependence of the two countries and deepening 
economic ties. In the energy sector development, consistent with Japanese energy policy, 
the Japan-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership (JUSEP) was signed. Both countries 
committed to spend $10 billion in LNG capacity building through highly advanced 
networked infrastructure with public-private partnerships in both countries.84 Both Japan 
and the U.S. will benefit from a well-functioning, competitive energy clearinghouse by 
fully integrating American shale-derived LNG into the Japanese energy markets. The 
subsequent competition should leverage the entire LNG value chain in helping to drive the 
economic and energy policies of the United States and Japan. This diversification and 
strategic energy partnership with a key ally has been immensely popular in Japan to help 
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meet Japan’s energy goals while providing a hedge against increasing Chinese LNG market 
share.85 
Trade with the well-developed North American LNG market should allow Japan to 
raise access and affordability criterion in the energy trilemma. In May 2018, the first 
shipment of the shale-extracted LNG was delivered to Japan by American suppliers.86 As 
the world’s largest LNG importer, Japan has led the development and liberalization of LNG 
markets to establish a highly flexible, efficient, and transparent trading for LNG. A market 
rebalancing toward Asia due to the rising regional demand is providing capital investment 
influx from electric and utilities companies of Japan. Figure 11 shows the LNG demand 
signal and the contracting opportunities for export, which are fantastic after 2020. 
 
Figure 11. Japan’s LNG import forecast by suppliers.87 
One of the strengths of Japan’s LNG policy is rooted in its location. Japan has a 
relatively easy access to receive imports from the United States. For purchasers, a Japanese 
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hub can provide flexibility in spot transactions, routing options to receive the optimal 
market price for non-contract buyers. For sellers, volume risk is diminished as Japan 
continues to transition to an LNG-centric energy consumer, which will lead to a sustainable 
and predictable sales targets. Additionally, open market access to the rest of Asia from 
Japan will lead to transparency and reasonable price stability, likely creating new 
demand.88 
The strategy for LNG market development also recognizes the benefits to the 
consumers of Japan. In the context of energy trilemma, it is a win-win scenario. The policy 
states that 
a flexible LNG market will also benefit the general public, the final 
consumers of natural gas. Expanding arbitrage trades of LNG is expected 
to reduce the Asian Premium, which becomes conspicuous when the crude 
oil price is noticeably higher than the gas price, and this will contribute to a 
reduction of energy prices and trade balance improvements. It will also be 
effective in enhancing the capacity to cope with emergencies in the event of 
a disruption of supply from specific regions or difficulty in securing a 
different power source. A stable supply of LNG not only supports 
sustainability and stable livelihoods and economic activities but may also 
help solve the issue of climate change. Furthermore, futures trading and 
other financial businesses may develop in addition to LNG trade. A flexible 
LNG market will also enable the global expansion of Japan’s LNG-related 
technologies and know-how and will thus contribute to expanding market 
frontiers for Japanese and international companies.89 
In the overall LNG market, a flexible energy policy is striving to achieve reduction 
of barriers such as elimination of destination clauses, a key issue discussed during the G7 
meetings and at the annual producers-consumers conference. Japan’s willingness to 
finance and provide technical expertise in both upstream and downstream projects to 
develop a strong global market with Japan as an LNG trading hub in Asia will not only 
increase the robustness of the energy markets in Asia but will provide a solid foundation 
for Japan’s energy transition. Once LNG has been established as a replacement for 
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traditional sources, the excess capital resources can be focused toward renewable energy 
transition. In the dawn of the LNG age, the term “Enevolution (or Energy Evolution)” 
effectively captures the bold policy steps Japan is taking to develop infrastructure and 
support the underlying human resource development.  
LNG trade requires a unique infrastructure to support import and export. Lack of 
land-based transport requires Japan to receive LNG shipments strictly via the sea. LNG 
terminals where enormous tankers can bunker is an extremely costly investment. Not only 
a phase conversion is required from gas to liquid at the export facility but a re-gasification 
terminal must be available at the import facility. The surge in the supply from American 
producers available to the Japanese demand forces is expected to intensify. Marcus King 
underscores the historic geographic disadvantage and writes that “North American 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports are bottlenecked [to Japan] due to the fact that there is 
now only one operable natural gas export terminal located in Alaska. This terminal is used 
primarily for exports to Japan. However, exports will increase with the construction of new 
terminals. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has approved the 
construction of seven additional terminals and six are under construction.”90 In Japan, the 
LNG market triangle—tradability, infrastructure, and price discovery—are signaling 
mechanisms to reveal a fundamental shift in the energy trilemma. Additionally, METI has 
approved a market expansion pathway via the development of LNG bunkering base where 
“Ship to Truck” and “Ship to Ship” infrastructure expansion can increase volume shipment 
and decrease time to delivery for consumers.  
Finally, as an emergency measure, LNG is also covered under the national 
stockpiling regulations. Compliance requirements also extend to the private sector with 
comprehensive required stockpiles of approximately 100 days of supply or 2.8 million tons 
of LNG by volume.91  
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E. FINDINGS 
The Great East Earthquake has fundamentally altered the energy policy trajectory 
of Japan. It has accelerated the innovative developments in the private sector, such as 
development of hydrogen-based technologies, in an effort to remove hydrocarbon-based 
use chains. Market targets and transactions have generally received positive support from 
the government in the attempt to decouple dependency on fossil fuels with economic 
growth. Japan continues to be a key international actor in changing the discourse around 
energy policy. Energy access, supply reliability, affordability and the overall integration of 
energy security in all aspects of consumer and industrial activities are at the center of 
Japan’s energy security vision and Japan is making progress in achieving goals set out in 
its Fifth Strategic Energy Plan document. 
Nesheiwat writes, “A more energy-secure Japan is not only a stronger U.S. ally, but 
an important regional leader. And a more energy-secure Japan is a stronger leader within 
the international community on critical global issues.”92 Japan’s unique vulnerability in 
energy security leads to a self-insuring behavior as a state from all of its economic partners. 
Lesbirel writes,  
It relies heavily on a portfolio approach which uses diversification and other 
measures such as stockpiling, alternative energy development and 
conservation, to reduce both specific and systemic risks to supply 
disruptions and to manage perceived or actual threats to oil supplies. But 
the insuring state also uses inducements which combine both deterrence and 
incentives to reduce risks and threats of interruptions to oil supplies. While 
Japan does not rely on direct military retaliation as a form of deterrence, it 
does rely indirectly on military retaliation by the U.S. and her allies in the 
context of the U.S. alliance system in the event of oil supply disruptions. 
However, in addition, it also employs incentives, mainly in the form of 
Overseas Development Assistance, to both oil supplier and non-supplier 
nations in the Middle East to reinforce that portfolio approach to minimising 
both specific and systemic risks and threats.93 
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Japan can leverage its unique advantage in engineering, infrastructure 
development, scientific research, and energy efficiency to accelerate energy transition. A 
strong technical expertise is allowing Japan to sponsor oil and LNG exploration 
domestically; however, unfortunately Japan’s geology is unlikely to reveal any significant 
opportunities. Japanese companies continue to provide significant assistance abroad in 
exchange for favorable supply lines and is likely to continue doing so in the future.  
Japan’s well-developed and modern infrastructure can be easily converted into 
delivering LNG instead of oil in a cost-effective manner without significantly disrupting 
domestic supply chains to consumers. A well-functioning private market enterprise in the 
energy transition policy can reduce frictions in transactions; however, for Japan, the exact 
energy mix for sustainable future is a matter of some political contention after Fukushima. 
Diversification, integration of LNG (both originating from Southeast Asia and American 
shale), and firm a diplomatic commitment should limit supply shocks and price 
vulnerability for end-users given the current energy strategy.  
Japan’s economic growth has peaked early compared to the rest of the powerhouse 
economies of Asia. Even though the overall demand is likely continuing to rise, Japan’s 
declining population should soften the demand signal in Northeast Asia. A soft demand 
projection provides little incentive for a liberalized, private enterprise to make large-scale 
capital investments, thus the existing METI and ANRE policy of incentivizing structural 
changes is aiding the transition, albeit slower than desired, to meet complete transition 
goals in a climate-change context. Extraction of methane hydrates from seabed can also 
help Japan achieve a positive movement in the energy trilemma; however, the technology 
still requires extensive research for commercialization. A high amount of public debt 
precludes the Federal Government of Japan from making significant investments on their 
own, thus a private enterprise buy-in is be required for a structural shift. 
The recent political sanctions on Iran by the United States should not affect Japan 
since American shale-derived natural gas can easily offset any demand shocks Japan 
experiences. The more significant political contention is likely to rise from maritime 
boundary disputes and competing economic zone claims in the Sea of Japan and East China 
Sea (ECS). American shale deliveries to Japan are in motion and are unlikely to stop soon, 
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thus Japan can easily opt to continue or even escalate maritime dispute over resources and 
ownership of the seabed in the name of national strategic interest if required. 
Overall, Japan’s energy strategy in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster is 
driven by the rational market-oriented decision making with the assistance from METI and 
ANRE to reduce externalities. With a sluggish economic growth, Japan’s ambitious 2030 
target is likely to be missed; however, Japan’s 2050 energy transition and carbon emissions 
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III. NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor catastrophe unfolded on March 11, 2011. 
A powerful earthquake-generated tsunami destroyed the infrastructure and nuclear power 
generation facilities at Fukushima. Prior to the Fukushima event, Japan maintained a 55-
reactor fleet to aid its electrical power demand throughout Japan, as shown in Figure 12. 
At the time of the incident, nuclear power was absolutely essential to the Japanese 
economy. It provided energy portfolio diversification, allowed flexibility in import 
independence from the Middle Eastern energy supply, and most importantly, it was an 
emissions-free energy source.94 According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), 
before 2011 Japan harvested 30% of its electrical demand from nuclear fission and was 
expected to rise to 40% by 2017.95 Currently, there are 17 reactor plants are awaiting 
governmental approval to restart operations pending safety inspections with another 37 
reactors in operationally capable status.96 Figure 13 shows the reactor status as of 
November 2018. 
To adequately understand the development of energy policy surrounding nuclear 
power generation, it is useful to illustrate the overview of interconnected governmental 
offices that dictate policy positions. The collective political capital of politicians will 
become an important point in determining the future of Japan’s nuclear power after the 
Fukushima Daichii nuclear power stations disaster. Prior to March 11, 2011, there were 
two separate offices at the cabinet level. The first was the Nuclear Safety Commission 
(NSC), responsible for developing the nuclear infrastructure, safety of nuclear facilities, 
and promoting an effective dialogue with the general public on the responsible use of 
nuclear technologies. On the other hand, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) outlined 
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the basis of nuclear policy for incorporating nuclear energy in the national energy mix. It 
was also responsible for oversight among Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry 
of Education, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), Ministry of Economy and Trade 
(METI), Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), and Nuclear and Industrial 
Safety Agency (NISA). Much of the decision structure was reformed to create a separate 
Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA), an independent organization.  
 
Figure 12. Location of Japan’s nuclear reactor fleet.97 
                                                 




Figure 13. Current status of Japan’s nuclear reactor fleet, as of November 
2018.98 
The Fukushima catastrophe clearly had a major impact on the economic vitality of 
Japan. Figure 14 shows the relative economic cost, compared to other catastrophes in the 
world. The economic cost of energy production, storage, transmission, and delivery in the 
supply-demand framework is critical to understand why Japan has placed nuclear power in 
the national security dialogue. Just before Fukushima, Japan met nearly 30% of its energy 
demand from nuclear power as mentioned before, which was planned to increase 
substantially by 2030 as part of an increased self-sufficiency agenda in the domestic energy 
production. The price stability of nuclear power was an attractive trait for both the 
government and the investors. Average cost of energy production via nuclear reactor is 
cheaper and is relatively stable, as it is not explicitly tied to foreign exchange rates. Broadly 
speaking, per kWh generation price increased after Fukushima as Japan experienced a 
negative supply shock and had to substitute imported sources to supplement the loss of 
nuclear power.  
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Figure 14. Financial cost of Fukushima disaster in Japan.99  
METI amended its target goals as significant structural changes were enacted in the 
overall energy policy in response to Fukushima. Within the 3E+S (Energy Security, Energy 
Equity, Environmental Considerations, and Safety) framework, the Japanese energy policy 
seeks to attain a high level of success within the energy trilemma by emphasizing safety in 
nuclear power plant restarts while simultaneously capitalizing on thermal efficiency and 
zero carbon dioxide emissions in power generation.100 The political forces against 
reimplementation of nuclear power remain a concern; however, the collective vested 
interest of the industry and their political sway, the economic cost of infrastructure 
replacement to abolish nuclear power, and a national desire to reduce import dependency 
on fossil fuels will keep nuclear thermal power generation a significant part of the 
discussion in the medium term. 
B. AMBITIONS 
In 2018, the Japanese Cabinet approved the strategic energy plan, which outlined 
new guidance and policies in reference to restart and operational use of nuclear power in 
the Japanese commercial, consumer, and industrial sector. Reinstating nuclear power with 
higher margins of safety has been the goal of industrial and government leaders. On one 
hand, scrapping the entire infrastructure supporting nuclear power generation, delivery, 
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and radioactive waste management is not feasible. On the other hand, the public outcry 
over safety lapses in the past are politically sensitive and must be tended to. Nonetheless, 
Japan’s nuclear power objectives for 2030 and 2050 remain essentially the same: raising 
Self-Sufficiency Rate (SSR), reduce the cost of electricity from current levels, and 
drastically cut GHG emissions in to the environment, stabilize the overall energy supply 
while elevating safety levels across the nuclear power enterprise.101  
It is worth mentioning the current work being done to restore public trust and 
transparency surrounding the Fukushima reactor decommissioning. TEPCO, Tokyo 
Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. – is committed to decommissioning the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear power station safely. Any Japanese reactors not meeting the 
current standards set by NRA have been placed on a permanent shutdown until they can be 
upgraded and inspected prior to returning to normal operation, if at all. By December 2011, 
cold shutdown conditions were achieved at Fukushima to significantly reduce the threat of 
radioactive emission into the atmosphere. By November 2013, fuel removal from spent 
fuel rods had started, and by December 2021, fuel debris removal is to be complete whereas 
the complete decommissioning of the reactor site is expected to take nearly 40 years at a 
high financial cost, according to the NRA.102 The following key principles are driving the 
energy policy surrounding reintroduction of nuclear power in Japan: separation of 
regulatory policy from utilization policy, comprehensive integration and merger of various 
regulatory offices under NRA’s jurisdiction, effective and transparent dissemination of 
information, enhanced nuclear power specific regulations to include development of 
countermeasures, back-fit of dated systems, establishing a 40-year operational limit, and a 
comprehensive nuclear emergency preparedness system.103 Under the updated NRA 
policy, “Twenty nuclear reactors in Japan have permanently retired in the wake of the 
Fukushima accident. Out of the remaining fleet of 34 operable reactors, nine are currently 
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operating, six others have received initial approval from the NRA, and another 12 units are 
under review and some reactor facilities have yet to file a restart application.”104 Figure 
15 shows the limited role played by nuclear power in 2017 due to regulatory constraints. 
Based on this trend, the 20–22% desired attainment for nuclear power seems wishful. In 
Figure 16, the total power utilization profile is presented. 
 
Figure 15. Total energy supply in Japan’s policy projection, energy policy 
mix from 2017 to 2030.105 
METI’s long-term projections show that nuclear energy remains a dependable and 
an important input into Japan’s economy and its overall energy demands. The power 
delivery infrastructure is complex and is tied significantly to the economic output of Japan. 
According to METI, 
Since the earthquake, the amount of emissions in the electric power field 
increased by 54 million tons due to reasons including generation of more 
electric power by thermal power plants as a substitution for nuclear power. 
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This is an increase of about 4% of the amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
in Japan as a whole.106 
 
Figure 16. Japan’s total power utilization profile, 2017.107 
Japan’s incredible technical expertise is well respected within the international 
community, but the events surrounding Fukushima provide a valuable learning opportunity 
for nations seeking to integrate nuclear power in to their economic energy security plan. 
Not just within METI, but the GOJ is actively involved as a respected member of the 
international community in promulgating issues discovered at Fukushima so they can be 
corrected at similar plant locations. 3E+S framework seeks to harness industry-leading 
safety practices as well as the latest technology to reinstate nuclear power in Japan. 
International cooperation in the energy supply-demand fluctuations is a central focus of 
Japan. Fission generation fits well within the overall strategy of reducing emissions while 
developing high levels of SSR in Japan. As METI outlines, 
Japan and the U.S., as partners, play a significant role in enhancing a global 
system for nuclear use while internationally ensuring peaceful use of 
nuclear power, nuclear non- proliferation, nuclear security, and so on 
through R&D cooperation and industrial cooperation utilizing the Japan-
U.S. Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation and other 
mechanisms.108 
International engagement is built within the agreements of the Kyoto Protocol, 
COP21, and COP23 and thus Japan is taking the lead in conversing with other members to 
fully integrate nuclear energy back into its economy. Japanese technological giants such as 
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Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba have already started to work with AREVA, a French 
company, to work toward improved technological design, engineering, and then export of 
energy technology.109 Countries like France effectively rely on nuclear power as a single 
major production source for their economic engine, and such model, at least partially, 
sought upon by Japan for its 2030 and 2050 goals to reach nuclear energy goals of 20–22% 
by 2030 and as required to achieve a carbon-neutral strategy beyond 2050. Specifically,  
in Europe, cooperation with France in the field of nuclear energy has been 
proceeding, such as the response to the TEPCO’s Fukushima nuclear 
accident and the international deployment of a jointly developed reactor, in 
addition to cooperation regarding the nuclear fuel cycle and the 
development of a fast reactor. GOJ continues to further enhance this 
cooperation through dialogues at the “Japan-France Nuclear Cooperation 
Committee,” etc. As to the cooperation with the United Kingdom, GOJ 
shares its knowledge concerning research and development of 
decommissioning and other technologies and exchanges views on an 
appropriate business environment of nuclear power generation in a 
liberalized market through dialogues of the “Japan-U.K. Nuclear 
Dialogue,” etc. Furthermore, with Europe as a whole GOJ promotes 
cooperation, including an exchange of information concerning common 
energy policy challenges, etc.110 
Promise of a reformed nuclear power in Japan is encouraging but will require 
compromise. As the memory of Fukushima failure fades and the efforts of the GOJ remain 
proactive in addressing the challenge, the public sentiment seems to favor energy 
independence. Citizens of Japan are more likely to support a policy objective that maintains 
accountability and sovereignty within the borders of Japan. Structurally, the issue of 
nuclear power in energy policy is fundamentally different from that of fossil fuels. To start: 
there are almost no import restrictions on raw materials and technology, existing 
infrastructure favors restart of nuclear power at its maximum safe capacity, and the politics 
have shifted from anti-nuclear leadership to the trusted pro-nuclear lobby in the 
government of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.  
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C. FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR POWER IN JAPAN, SHORT AND LONG 
TERM 
Japan faces a tough reality in energy security. Innovation is likely to replace many 
of the legacy technologies currently in use. From a SWOT analysis perspective, the 
applicability and feasibility of nuclear power is excellent. Core of nuclear power strength 
is that technology is widely available. A weakness and threat in nuclear power is the 
possibility of another nuclear accident on the island, but proactive safety considerations 
can reduce the likelihood of another one. Opportunities for use and implementation are 
abundant within Japan, even after Fukushima. As long as proper safety protocols are met, 
the direct public opposition has largely abated and managing expectations of the population 
will be paramount. Unfortunately, the risk of a disaster remains given Japan’s geography, 
but engineering and design changes can minimize the overall impact should there be 
another Fukushima-type event. Fortunately, the greatest threat to nuclear power is 
innovation in renewable technologies. As long as the collective renewable energy sources 
are able to sustain the power demand throughout the day, the economic forces of supply 
and demand may help to diminish nuclear power from Japan’s energy mix with the current 
trend. Today, Japan’s nuclear energy sector is slow to recover but the return to previous 
levels of nuclear energy production is completely possible as long as safety protocols and 
improved regulations imposed by NRA are met. Business Monitor International (BMI) 
emphasizes that “despite the delays in restarts, we expect that the Japanese government 
will focus on increasing nuclear generation in the country’s power mix.”111 The nuclear 
power paradox is a trade-off choice between either meeting emissions reduction goals and 
securing domestic energy supply or risk missing emission targets and risk greater foreign 
dependency, a true opportunity cost.  
Japan faces a precarious energy demand forecast at the national level with zero-
sum demand trends. While some government intervention would distort the market 
efficiency mechanisms due to deadweight losses, the GOJ intentionally refuses to solely 
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rely on market-clearing mechanisms to balance the supply-demand equilibrium for nuclear 
issues. Built-in reserve capacity allows maximum flexibility when peak power demands 
are relayed on the infrastructure. During which nuclear power can serve as a base-loading 
energy source during an unassisted (no LNG or renewable sources feeding the grid) peak 
demand windows. Nuclear power is the fastest way to meet rising demand in a short period 
of time and when required LNG or renewables can be used as supplemental power sources 
during severe needs or adverse weather conditions. The de-regulation of the transmission 
markets and separate, independent enforcing mechanisms should again allow nuclear 
power to achieve greater credibility in the energy markets for investors and consumers. 
The significant capital investment requirements for nuclear power and long lead times for 
planning to delivery of an operational plant can cause significant mismatches in the supply-
demand portfolio often leading to cost overruns and underutilization of infrastructure. This 
is equally politically risky given the significant debt burden of the government as it is. The 
endogenous variable of declining electricity use in a declining population base makes 
planning for large-scale capital investments difficult to synchronize with the energy policy 
published by METI and ANRE.  
Conventional commercial labor safety and NRA standards have been revised to 
include more stringent criteria to permit operation, delaying the restart of capable power 
plants due to significant economic costs. If the specifics of the regulatory requirement are 
balanced against the future revenue forecasts from a given plant are net negative, utility 
companies are inclined to decommission the plant to shift resources elsewhere, mainly to 
renewables. Many of the newly imposed requirements after Fukushima require intense 
infrastructure construction. For example, power plants must meet the following criteria as 
part of a broader safety targets to produce energy again: guarding against intentional 
airplane crashes, measures to suppress radioactive diffusion of material, measures against 
preventing damage of containment vessels, procedures to prevent core damage, unexpected 
fire considerations, reliability of ancillary facilities, uninterrupted power supplies in the 
event of main power disruption, breakwater walls to prevent tsunami damage if one occurs, 
core cooling capacity with portable pumps from portable power sources for significant 
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period of time.112 To achieve a zero-accident facility, Behling, Williams, and Managi 
mentions,  
Japan could also invest in upgrades to its existing reactors. According to a 
2014 estimate by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), a 
total of about $17 billion would be needed to harden all reactors, except for 
those to be decommissioned. There were 40 dormant reactors at the time, 
so this would amount to $425 million per reactor. Costs would likely be 
more today. While hardening seems like a desirable goal, the program 
would apply to reactors that are based on technology and designs dating 
back to the 1960s, and many of these reactors are located near seismically 
active geologic faults.113  
The marginal gain in revenue may or may not be sufficient to justify capital 
investment in the nuclear energy market, especially when coupled with a declining 
population. The uncertainty in demand forecasting and the added NRA requirements pose 
a significant threat to the economic decision making in fortifying Japanese energy security 
with regard to nuclear power.  
The incremental added capacity as latent reactors are operational poses a net loss 
to the industry due to opportunity cost of investing elsewhere. Additionally, energy use is 
relatively strongly correlated with national economic performance. This historic 
relationship guides decision making to determine the accurate energy needs of the country. 
Currently, Japan operates to the left of the average total variable cost curve, meaning the 
cost of electricity from nuclear power is higher than it needs to be due to shortages in 
supply. A cost-minimizing power-generation capacity balanced against the overall energy 
goals is a complex equilibrium, largely led by private-sector market forces. As Medlock 
and Hartley write from their research, “In the power market model, new capacity will be 
constructed if and only if the discounted present value of the margin between the 
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(anticipated) wholesale electricity price and the marginal operating costs of production of 
the new capacity is greater than or equal to the capital cost of construction.”114 
In the global market for energy, Japan faces an acute challenge: currency 
fluctuations and weakening of the Japanese Yen. Affordable electricity access, considered 
an essential utility and a public good for the purposes of this analysis as part of the energy 
trilemma, is vital for the Japanese economy. The consumer faces variable import costs at 
the mercy of global market forces. Just in the past few years, energy import costs have 
risen nearly 30% for an average Japanese consumer. Fortunately, price rise was limited 
with the concurrent fall in oil prices, but based on Medlock and Hartley’s analysis, “nuclear 
power helps provide stable fuel costs on a day-to-day basis and protect overall national 
economic performance during times of disruption or crisis.”115 
Prime Minister Abe’s return to power has helped to revive the nuclear power 
prospects in Japan. The economic stagnation in Japan allows political flexibility in 
dismissing nuclear-free energy policies of the previous administration. The legal 
opposition is filtering through the judicial systems as outlines in Fitch’s Japan report that 
“the Fukui District Court, for example, ruled against the restarting of the No. 3 and 4 
reactors at Kansai Electric’s Ohi plant in May 2014, accepting arguments that an accident 
at the plant could endanger surrounding residents.”116  
Overall, nuclear energy is poised to return to the energy mix in a greater capacity 
to supplement the trilemma and provide opportunities for growth, but it faces long-term 
structural challenges of being displaced by innovation and renewable technologies. 
Japan is a core member of the Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy Future (NICE) 
development group. As all countries move toward decarbonisation of their economies, 
Japan has taken an advisory lead in reforming their market structures, valuation methods 
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of assets, providing financial assistance and in construction of new reactors while providing 
technical and managerial assistance. Domestically, a key threat to the Japanese nuclear 
energy policy, at least in the 2030 timeline is the remaining financial value of the reactors 
already built. In the 2050 timeline, most, if not all, will have depreciated enough to not 
warrant significant capital investment to extend their lifetimes by refueling. Behling, 
Williams, and Managi further outlines that  
Japan’s government and electric power industry invested a total of about 
$130 billion over the past 50 years to build a total of 57 power-generating 
reactors, or an average of $2.3 billion per reactor. A large majority of these 
reactors were based on so-called Generation II designs that were introduced 
in the 1960s. Today, a Generation III advanced boiling water reactor 
(ABWR) would cost $4 billion to build. Assuming an advanced reactor that 
was consistent with a goal of zero accidents would cost at least $4 billion, 
and Japan were to aim for a fleet of 25 ABWRs, capital costs would amount 
to at least $100 billion, spread over the next decade or so. Additional costs 
would be incurred to locate these new reactors in geologically “quiet” 
areas.117  
Aside from safety and dismantling costs, operating costs will be minimal and will 
free up capital resources to be invested in renewable technologies that enjoy significant 
political support and economic feasibility. Pure economic models advise against 
incremental investments in the existing power industry due to variability in capital resource 
requirements. In striving for a zero-accident culture while maintaining nuclear energy as a 
core driver of energy policy through 2030 and toward decarbonisation in 2050, it would 
cost Japan approximately $193 to $215 billion to build new reactors and $132 to $582 
billion for modernizing its existing fleet, including the estimated cost of accidents 
underwritten by the probability of having accidents.118 This is a significant total cost of 
nuclear power generation, a large share of the overall economic activity. According to the 
Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan, the cost of an additional Fukushima-
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type disaster would be nearly $850 billion, the value of all the power generated in Japan 
over the last 40 years, an unacceptable proposition.119  
D. FINDINGS 
Nuclear power in Japan is poised to return to the energy mix in a greater capacity 
through 2025 as a greater percentage of sidelined power plants are recertified for operation. 
The Japanese government and METI’s goals of 2030 are likely to be missed for 
incorporating nuclear power, but prospects for 2050 are realistic toward both integration 
of nuclear power in a greater capacity as well as toward complete decarbonisation. In 2019, 
the political support remains firm from the power-generation industry and lobbyists in 
favor of returning to nuclear power in a greater capacity. Systemic financial challenges 
obstruct an efficient implementation of energy policy as envisioned by METI and the GOJ. 
On a per kWh cost-basis, nuclear energy remains the cheapest option with the closest direct 
substitution of coal when viewed with a long time horizon and with economies of scale. It 
is relatively difficult to scale up nuclear power production from the existing fleet during 
times of peak demand, thus LNG and traditional fuel sources will have to bridge the chasm 
when needed. The financial incentives provided by the government are likely not enough 
to stem the transition away from nuclear power and toward alternate energy sources. While 
it may be even cheaper to produce kWh with newer technologies, the economies of scale 
do not yet exist for large-scale implementation to displace nuclear power.  
The strength of the nuclear enterprise in Japan is the reserve capacity and relatively 
short notice scalability to provide adequate and affordable power throughout Japan, 
independent of weather patterns and seasonal considerations. Fission power is also free of 
GHG emission, helping Japan meet its international climate accord goals. Unfortunately, 
new capital investment will be limited to the cost-benefit analysis of marginal revenue 
against marginal cost, and it is unlikely that the market will justify large-scale investment 
in construction of new reactors. Limited immediate opportunities exist to return the existing 
fleet to full normal operation given the imposed safety requirements by NRA and the 
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financial cost of implementing them, especially for those reactors near the end of their 
service life. Opportunities in the liberalization of generation and transmission markets 
should allow flexibility to reduce cost for the consumers, enhancing the trilemma score. 
The single greatest threat to the nuclear power industry is the innovation in solar, wind, 
hydrogen, tidal, and biomass power-generation techniques since they offer benefits of a 
clean energy infrastructure without the extremely high downside risk of a nuclear disaster.  
Japan continues to recover from the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the progress 
has been modest. The popular sentiment toward reinstatement of nuclear power is a battle 
between domestic independence versus foreign dependency and high variable costs of 
LNG and oil versus the relatively stable cost of nuclear thermal generation. The 
radioactivity concerns will limit the complete decommissioning of the remaining reactor 
infrastructure, and the exact same risks and limitations apply to the rest of the fleet when 
they are decommissioned. Storage and disposal of spent fuel and contaminated reactor 
vessel water further complicate the decision making for leaders in embracing nuclear 
power generation after Fukushima. In the short to medium term, nuclear power provides a 
transition bridge to a completely green economy as nuclear energy remains a vital part of 
the energy mix. However, in the long-term, with the development of efficient green 
markets, research and development, and global innovation, should lead the Japanese energy 
sector out of the reliance on nuclear power as a source of base-loading in the commercial 
and industrial sectors. 
The free-market forces are leaning toward energy independence harvested from 
renewable energy sources. The opportunity cost of delaying capital investment into 
renewable energy enterprise is extremely high. Japan’s international reputation as an 
innovative state and a leader in bold reforms toward decarbonisation is at stake. Japan’s 
current energy portfolio filled with modest renewable energy, excluding nuclear power, is 
respectable given the topography of the land. Japan has recognized the market 
opportunities in embracing green technologies, and given the right set of policies, full 








IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
In Japan, the energy security gap can easily be bridged with renewable energy 
sources. Electricity generated from solar radiation and kinetic wind energy, geothermal, 
hydropower (harvested from water movements), tidal energy (harvested from coastal tide 
fluctuations), biomass, and various other non-traditional energy sources have developed a 
footprint in Japan. For the purposes of this research, most of the focus will be devoted to 
solar and wind power and to a lesser extent the potential of geothermal, hydropower, ocean 
energy (also called marine energy or tidal power), and hydrogen technology will be 
discussed. At the expense of uncertainty, the developmental state of hydrogen power and 
its viability in Japanese economy are mentioned at the end as part of broader energy 
security discussion in the future.  
In 2016, Japan was one of the premier market investment destinations for alternate 
fuel sources, according to International Trade Administration’s (ITA) 2016 Top Markets 
Report on Renewable Energy.120 The report goes on to note that Japan’s sector rankings 
were favorable for energy security and further investment in the renewables market. It 
ranked solar sector 1st overall, geothermal at 11th, hydropower at 20th, and wind at 
40th.121 In just two years’ time since ITA’s report, Japan has made significant development 
in adopting renewable technologies as part of its energy security model. According to 
REN21, a global think-tank researching sustainable energy issues noted significant gains 
the Japanese renewable market has made. In REN’s Renewable 2019: Global Status 
Report, it ranked Japan 3rd in annual investment and net capacity addition via production 
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in the renewable power and fuels, behind China and the United States.122 Excluding 
hydropower, the report goes on to rank Japan as fifth overall in total capacity generation as 
of end of the 2018.123 Additionally, Japan’s nationwide solar photovoltaic installation 
capacity and per capita photovoltaic installation capacity are ranked behind China, the 
United States, and Germany.124 In the post-Fukushima era, Chen, Kim, and Yamaguchi 
identify the need for countries of East Asia to fully and completely integrate the 
sustainability model within their national energy systems.125 Through policy prescriptions 
such as the Sunshine Project, the New Sunshine Project, the 1997 New Energy Act, the 
2009 Non-Fossil Energy Act, and the general pivot toward a Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) since 2003, the market has been shifting the Japanese energy industry in a more 
sustainable direction to achieve an optimized energy trilemma. This trend is simultaneously 
reducing the dependence on imported fossil fuels and racing to meet the emissions 
requirements set forth by treaties Japan is signatory to.  
In Chen, Kim, and Yamaguchi’s analysis,  
Japan has set a goal to expand its renewable energy capacity from the 
current 39.2 GW to 85.83 GW by 2020, in which 21 GW will come from 
hydropower. The country aims to increase its PV capacity to 28 GW – 
almost six fold – and double its wind capacity to 5 GW in the next decade. 
Solar PV will share one-third of the total renewable energy capacity by 2020 
if the goal is achieved.126 
Chen, Kim and Yamaguchi’s article was published in 2014 and while it accurately 
identifies the trends in the sustainable energy marketplace, the energy security policy and 
marketplace has shifted dramatically since then in the positive direction. The abundant 
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potential of renewable energy remains promising and technological innovation is 
surpassing new efficiency limits in harvesting energy from various sources. Japan’s Fifth 
Strategic Energy Plan, most recently updated in 2018 highlights the need to shift to a large-
scale adoption of renewable technologies in the consumer and industrial sectors. It attempts 
to set realistic and attainable goals for the Japanese energy transition and overall energy 
security consistent with Japan’s 2030 and 2050 objectives. 
B. AMBITIONS 
Energy transition in any country requires structural change and in that, Japan is not 
unique. Japan’s two distinctive milestones of energy security in 2030 and in 2050 require 
a unique and an innovative economic landscape to succeed. Renewable energy is 
particularly important because it is the least controversial. Viewed from the environmental 
sustainability lens, it is the least risk burdened, enjoys wide public acceptance, and achieves 
the goals of energy security while offsetting GHG emissions. Selena Kaneko underlines 
the importance of the public perception of renewable power policymaking and how it shifts 
based on adaptation. Kaneko writes that local participation, choice and availability, and 
strategy of business professionals in the industry provide the grassroots microeconomic 
forces needed to force energy transition.127 Since the 2011 Fukushima catastrophe, public 
perception has been one of the driving forces of energy transition in Japan. As discussed 
previously, traditional fuel sources remain formidable, but the democratic forces have 
successfully parlayed the requirements of safety and environmental sustainability as the 
supreme concern for voters. To that end, minimum achievement of 24% renewable energy 
by 2030, the reduction of GHG by 80% in 2050 and aggressive and near-complete de-
carbonization are the stated goals of the GOJ and METI.128 Continued pressure from the 
electorate is critical for continued reform. 
Traditional fuel sources enjoy the built-in economic advantage such that they 
require no changes in the consumer or industrial consumption preferences. The economic 
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aspect of energy transition is as much about supporting national goals of prosperity as they 
are about a more sustainable future. METI’s strategic energy plan does provide a point of 
consideration. It states that “initiatives aimed at energy transitions are not about unfettered 
optimism. All energy sources have strengths and weaknesses. The energy structure is 
characterized by the complex interaction between technology, infrastructure, industrial 
structure, and policy system.”129 
In Japan’s energy transition, it will become essential, as much as possible to 
substitute renewable power in place of traditional sources. Power variability is often 
pointed out as unsuitability of renewable power as the primary source, but it is a problem 
of engineering and not of feasibility. Stewart Needham, in his analysis of renewable energy 
as a primary power, states that “the more decentralized distribution of renewable resources 
compared to fossil fuels will require reconfiguration of the national electricity grid to better 
integrate power inputs from more variable input sources and reduce transmission losses 
from the more remote renewable sites.”130 The grid integration problem is one of the 
biggest challenges facing Japan. In fact, the 2016 Top Markets Report stated that “in 
December 2014, a report from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, said that 
seven out of the ten utilities would not be able to integrate the planned solar capacity under 
the FIT mechanism with their existing network.”131 The incentives of lower operating 
costs and higher margins are forcing regulators and industry professionals to work together 
to find a solution. 
Needham’s research notes that when compared to traditional sources, even when 
per kWh cost may be higher “this differential disappears when the costs of carbon capture 
and sequestration are included in the price of coal and gas-based generation.”132 
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Needham’s analysis focuses on Australia, but the analytical results are equally applicable 
to Japan in their energy security ambitions. Japan’s energy policy and energy trilemma 
goals are focused on achieving renewable energy as a competitive, cost-effective, and 
widely adopted substitute power source during times of peak demand. 
One of the greatest weaknesses to the current renewable energy policy is 
involuntary output curtailment program practiced by METI. Currently in Japan,  
A power producer is subject to the output curtailment rule under which a 
power producer must temporarily cease or curtail the supply of power to the 
grid at a general transmission and distribution operator’s request on the 
grounds listed in the related ministerial ordinance such as certain technical 
or safety reasons, and balance of the supply and demand of electricity in the 
entire grid, in principle, without compensation.133  
Even though output curtailment compensation is provided over 360 hours for solar, 
or 720 hours for wind, it must be constantly amended to reflect true realities of the 
marketplace, as more renewable technologies join the grid to compete against traditional 
power sources. Bird et al. write in their analysis of curtailment policies around the world 
that various variables including generation mix, market structure, operating rules of the 
power companies, and power management at the transmission level affect the curtailment 
and renewable energy penetration.134 Market reforms and liberalization are essential in 
high output renewable sectors to sustain the growth pace as penetration levels increase in 
different geographic areas. Ultimately, flexibility in generation and transmission systems, 
availability and flexibility in storage technologies, and dynamic demand management will 
allow Japan to reach their ambitious goal of high utilization of renewable sector within 
their energy trilemma while reducing GHG emissions from traditional sources.  
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C. SOLAR ENERGY 
In the decades before Fukushima, Japan had made steady progress toward 
achieving a high degree of renewable energy market development. Japan also is the highest 
exporter of solar photovoltaic technology due to free market forces in operation without 
local content or import tariff policies, which allow it to directly compete with both the 
United States and European markets.135 Kinoshita, Wagatsuma, and Okada’s research 
alludes to solar radiation availability and daily average temperature reached per day in 
Japan.136 Kinoshita, Wagatsuma, and Okada’s data range covers years 1971 to 2000 and 
it is a useful map to understand solar photovoltaic potential of Japan contemporarily which 
is extracted from SolarGIS for Japan. Rodrigues et al. point out that “Japan has a good 
solar insolation value (4.3–4.8 kW h/m2 day) and is a leading manufacturer of solar panels, 
in which most of the PV systems are grid-connected.”137 
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Figure 17. Distribution map of amount of global solar radiation in Japan.138 
 
Figure 18. Distribution map of mean daily maximum temperature in Japan.139 
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139 Source: Kinoshita, Wagatsuma and Okada, 4. 
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Figure 19. Distribution map of solar photovoltaic potential in Japan.140 
In Chowdhury et al.’s analysis of data shows an exponential increase in the 
development of solar photovoltaic installed capacity in Mega Watts (MW).141 
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Figure 20. Trend of solar photovoltaic capacity in Japan since 1990.142 
 
Figure 21. Exponential rise of photovoltaic, comparison of largest markets 
compared to Japan.143 
Chowdhury’s analysis goes on to discuss the initial phasing of the solar 
photovoltaic market development in Japan under the Sunshine Project between 1974 and 
1981 with an investment from METI of approximately 2.5 billion JPY. With the oil crises 
of the 1970s, the need for alternate fuel sources to power the Japanese economy became 
apparent. Chowdhury identified three distinct phases of integration of solar photovoltaic 
                                                 
142 Chowdhury, 288. 
143 Renewables Now 21 (REN21), 95. 
72 
into the Japanese economy with 1) initial technology development, 2) market development 
to incentivize adoption, and 3) market development with and without subsidy to understand 
the economic forces that directly impact the energy security of Japan.144  
This research is intended to focus on events in the renewable marketplace to 
understand energy security challenges in the post-Fukushima era; however, the policy 
enacted prior to it is an important scene setter in understanding how Japan intends to fully 
integrate solar power in the economy. METI had ambitious solar photovoltaic goals as 
early as 1980s. Chowdhury et al.’s analysis shows that in the 1990s METI simplified 
installation procedures of photovoltaic systems to lower bureaucratic burden, an energy 
buy-back system was developed to sell back excess energy at reasonable market prices.145 
Their research goes on to note that with the New Sunshine Project, penetration of 
photovoltaic technologies accelerated in the consumer marketplace with subsidy of up to 
50% of installation costs by the GOJ. The analysis points out that METI provided upfront 
seed money for the advanced development and industrialization of photovoltaic 
technologies, essentially reducing the negative monetary externality to zero as failure costs 
would be absorbed by the GOJ.146 Since 2011, GOJ has continued to subsidize 
photovoltaic market development by reforming purchasing mechanisms of excess grid 
power, adjusted residential photovoltaic system subsidy for installation and net-metering, 
and implemented a feed-in-tariff (FIT) mechanisms.  
The introduction of FIT in 2012 greatly expanded market access to investors across 
the world, overriding the existing RPS and purchasing mechanisms for photovoltaic 
electricity in Japan. The Ichigo Green Infrastructure Investment Cooperation (IGIIC) 
accurately describes FIT policy as an incentive to “create a virtuous cycle of investment, 
innovation, and cost reductions.”147 FIT end-goals are consistent with METI’s 2030 
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innovation and implementation strategy noted in the Fifth Strategic Energy Plan. IGIIC 
goes on to note “Under Japan’s FIT system, electric utilities and merchants purchase 
renewable-generated electricity at prices and contract durations set by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry. End-users then pay a surcharge to help cover the renewable 
portion of the total power supply.”148 Having long-term FIT contracts in place allows 
capital intensive projects, such as large-scale photovoltaic installation, to recover the sunk 
cost at a guaranteed reasonable rate on investment because, “electric power companies are 
obliged to purchase electricity generated from renewable energy sources on a fixed-period 
contract at a fixed price,”149 according to IEA’s analysis.  
Without parity to traditional sources, it is nearly impossible for renewables to 
compete with legacy energy markets. Keiji Kimura of Renewable Energy Institute in Japan 
writes 
by implementing the renewable energy support policies in the initial stage 
of deployment, the gradual cost reduction will eventually enable renewable 
energy to compete over time in the electricity market against conventional 
energy sources, inclusive of social costs, without any particular policy 
support.150  
Kimura stresses the importance of METI and ANRE revising poor administration 
rules and pricing mechanisms need to be aligned with cost reduction goals for the entire 
market segment.151  
FIT mechanism, essentially is a cost sharing agreement between power generation 
facilities and consumers since early stage implementation costs are high for new 
technologies before economies of scale are achieved. The policy element facilitates, and 
even obligates procurement transaction between buyers and sellers of electricity reducing 
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the likelihood of market failure.152 The end user pays the cost, in the form of a surcharge, 
for purchasing energy from renewable sources and utilities pay their share to the amount 
equal to the generation cost they would avoid had they purchased from producers.153 A 
FIT mechanism is shown below in Figure 22 that shows the exchange of incentives for 
each party to reduce the externalities in the marketplace to reduce the transaction costs 
borne by the market and pass on the savings in terms of a consumer and a producer surplus. 
 
Figure 22. Japan’s feed-in-tariff (FIT) mechanism in renewable energy 
marketplace.154 
Takuya Yamazaki, Director of renewable energy division within ANRE and METI 
understand the importance of an efficient market operation in Japan to allow deeper 
penetration of sustainable energy sources. He points out that Japan’s electrical markets 
were regionally segmented before Fukushima, with the 60 Hz frequency power in the west 
and 50 Hz frequency power distribution in the east, creating a requirement for a frequency 
conversion site. Yamazaki writes that markets become inefficient when Japan is divided 
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into 10 regional utilities that is operated and controlled by a single utility provider, making 
it extremely difficult to manage cross-regional supply and demand fluctuations.155 Much 
of the transmission infrastructure for solar photovoltaic is shared with traditional utilities. 
Since the gradual deregulation of generation, transmission, distribution, and retail energy 
markets, renewable adoption rate has increased significantly. Renewable technologies in 
general enjoy a 26% annual average growth rate since 2012, with the largest share 
accounted by solar photovoltaic under the FIT scheme.156 Additionally, FIT policy has 
raised renewable generation to 58.6 TWh, equivalent to approximately 18.89 million 
households.157 
Japan’s solar photovoltaic market faces systemic weaknesses and threats but also 
have many opportunities for gain due to inherent strength of the fuel source. F. 
Muhammad-Sukki et al.’s analysis suggest that any non-residential installation, greater 
than 100kW could see a gain of nearly 8% per annum, higher than European markets in a 
similar segment.158 High cost of design-to-operation implementation, also called 
construction costs, and large number of total generation cells are required for meaningful 
commercial production. To reduce price volatility and provide adequate investor returns, 
often times the industry will resort to traditional fuel sources, which have a lower, 
established and predictable kWh unit cost.  
As the solar photovoltaic market matures in Japan, the energy policies will have to 
change to account for the increased opportunity for adoption, use, and investment in the 
industry to achieve a high-energy trilemma score. As a direct competitor to the Japanese 
market, an analysis by Solar Power Europe points out that “the solar market is in the middle 
of a transition from its lucrative FIT scheme to auctions and self-consumption. But with a 
huge FIT pipeline waiting for installation…the Japanese photovoltaic Energy Association 
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(JPEA) expect the country’s solar downturn to continue until 2024, before market design 
and infrastructure will be ready for further growth.”159 
Even though the promise of solar photovoltaic is immense in Japan, it is worth 
noting the demographic shifts, long-term deflationary forces, a declining population, and 
high levels of public debt as a cause for economic concern. A declining population often 
correlates to a shrinking economic output due to systematic unavailability of the labor 
force. The Japanese market runs the risk of overinvestment in solar photovoltaic sector due 
to its immense potential based on Japan’s solar radiation availability. Komiyama and Fujii 
notes that “The expectation for future rapid deployment of PV system has highlighted the 
significance of efficiently balancing the temporal change of power supply and demand in 
the Japanese electricity system.”160 Their analysis goes on to say that Japanese markets 
may experience a slowdown when installed photovoltaic capacity is greater than efficient 
use patterns because their solar potential is equivalent to nearly 40 times of peak 
demand.161 A policy review at a predetermined interval could help balance the supply and 
demand forces to efficiently transition to a fully renewable generation market.  
Another constraint faced by the Japanese solar market is the variability in landscape 
and topography where generation projects could be installed. Geography specific climate 
and output variability will impact the management of energy agenda for METI. Variability 
in landscape and climate leads to an unbalanced mix of renewable power generation, says 
Yamazaki.162 Unbalanced generation portfolio weakens the overall energy policy because 
the invisible hand of the market steers investment toward preferential products due to more 
immediate returns, which in this case is solar. While FIT scheme overall is effective at 
promoting solar photovoltaic, it also drowns out nascent technologies. Japan is aware of 
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such challenges and is addressing them slowly, for example, the right to use sea area to the 
lowest-bidding energy generators for offshore wind farms. Wind is quickly becoming an 
essential complimentary generation source to solar as will be discussed in the next section.  
D. WIND ENERGY 
A particular factor toward renewable wind energy in Japan is that there is a 
collective community buy-in mindset. The Japanese societal awareness of environmental 
issues is remarkable, resisting a modern lifestyle at the expense of nature.163 Japan’s ample 
coastline offers sufficient opportunities for offshore wind project development. Over the 
past couple of decades, the renewable energy investment trend has largely favored the solar 
sector; however, the wind energy development is rapidly expanding. Regulatory policy has 
lagged behind market capacity to capitalize a budding industry in the last few years. A 
combination of favorable legislative agenda and a short-term net-positive cost-benefit 
policy could strengthen the industry against other renewable energy options. Wind 
development growth is often inhibited by geographic constraints but is gaining prominence 
in Japanese communities to expand Japan’s overall renewable reach and solidify energy 
trilemma.  
Japan’s Wind Power Association (JWPA), an industry group, is working towards 
developing better policies with the government to seamlessly incorporate wind power 
within Japanese energy security by aiming to supply nearly 20% of Japan’s domestic 
electric power demand from wind generation, both onshore and offshore, by 2050.164 
JWPA’s mid-term and long-term installation goals are distinct and aligned with the overall 
METI energy policy goals. A mid-term goal of approximately 84,000 GWh/year, about 9% 
of total demand and long-term goal of 188,000 GWh/year, totaling about 20% of domestic 
demand are feasible given the right set of market conditions and investments, as shown in 
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the graph below.165 Wind proponents in general face a problem of land availability in 
Japan. Current GOJ regulations state that land without ownership must be available for 
public use and not for power generation.166 A justification could be made for power 
generation and its utility as a public good. METI and the cabinet must pass new legislation 
for markets to take advantage of this opportunity to provide an essential utility to the people 
of Japan at the lowest possible cost, enhancing the affordability aspect of the trilemma.  
 
Figure 23. Japan’s wind resource availability, density potential map.167 
                                                 
165 Japan Wind Power Association, 2. 
166 Lain Wilson, “Japan’s Secondary Solar Market Showing Strength: Q&A,” BloombergNEF, last 
modified September 17, 2018, https://about.bnef.com/blog/japans-secondary-solar-market-showing-
strength-qa/. 




Figure 24. Japan’s wind resource availability, wind speed map.168 
 
Figure 25. Japan’s wind power installation capacity roadmap.169 
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Japan remains one of the last untapped wind energy markets in the world. Carbon 
Trust, a leading organization for sustainable future, in their report titled Appraisal of the 
Offshore Wind Industry in Japan report that Japan must overcome regulatory, technical, 
and policy issues for effective wind power generation.170 Reliability and compatibility of 
the transmission grid remain a central issue, a threat similar to solar power generation. 
Frequency converters are required at the nexus of east and west grids, making it more 
challenging to supply power reliably across all the prefectures. Especially with Hokkaido 
and Tohuku transmission lines, the bottleneck and limited band capacity require technical 
and policy solutions to solve because it is where wind power is both abundant and most 
cost-effective.171 Markets are further hampered by the lengthy consenting process in the 
contracts that stretch deployment times, ultimately raising costs for investors and is a 
significant weakness of the market. Availability of wind is disproportionately high in the 
north, and thus Japan will have to build installation and maintenance facilities ports close 
to wind farms given the relatively deep waters near its shore across the board.  
Japan dominates the wind turbine manufacturing industry. Fuji and Hitachi are 
giants in the industry with nearly 86% of the turbines manufactured by Japan in the 
world.172 In March 2018, Japan’s cabinet approved a set of rules that promote offshore 
wind development, a favorable decision because, “Onshore wind farms face resistance 
because of noise pollution concerns. Yet large offshore wind farms can be built since they 
are often located far from residential areas. In addition, offshore farms benefit from a feed-
in-tariff price of 36 yen per kilowatt-hour, which is double the price for solar energy, and 
more than the 20 yen fetched by onshore wind generators.”173 JWPA’s goals would 
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provide a CO2 reduction of approximately 32 M CO2 t/year by 2030 and would rise to 
nearly 99 M CO2 t/year.174 
As part of the G7 member state consensus, Japan participates in site-specific 
auctions for off-shore wind development. It helps reduce investor risks by negating 
information asymmetry and increasing market efficiency. International Renewable Energy 
Agency states that “pre-selecting a site typically implies that the installed capacity and grid 
interconnections are determined beforehand, allowing policy makers and project 
developers to concentrate their efforts on the challenges and features of the chosen site, 
and to tailor the auction design and awarded contract to these conditions.”175 To strengthen 
the regulatory environment, Japan has revised the port and harbor statute, which eased 
restrictions on wind power development near port infrastructure. These statutes provide 
further guidance for domestic and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), a strong policy signal 
for market development opportunity. 
Wind power will become viable when its substitutability to traditional power reach 
parity in terms of costs. On average, wind generated power is far less costly than solar 
power per kWh and has slightly greater utilization rate.176 The added reduced cost signals 
the market for more investment because one wind turbine offers an exponential power 
generation compared to a one photovoltaic panel. Cost reduction remains a significant goal 
for the manufacturers and policy makers for the market to encourage greater rates of 
adoption. Keiji Kimura, author is Analysis of Wind Power Costs in Japan at the Renewable 
Energy Institute provides an overview of the associated costs that must reach parity: 
Investment costs, operation and maintenance costs, and a cost-benefit analysis of 
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investment afforded to the actual amount of electricity generated.177 Kimura notes that 
while global turbine costs have been decreasing due to economies of scale and competition 
between firms in the European Union and the United States, labor costs in Japan have 
varied and largely increased over the past decade.178  
Ultimately, the global and domestic Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)179 must 
be comparable for a decisive wide-scale penetration into the consumer and industrial 
consumption. Today, that is not the case. As Tarak Shah posits, “government policy 
barriers are driving up costs for wind energy unfairly. Specifically, a long and complex 
land use planning and environmental assessment processes for onshore and offshore wind 
power development, which is said to take three-four years on average, raises project 
development costs unnecessarily. In addition, all wind power projects over 10MW are 
required to go through this process.”180  
Essentially, any largescale project laments the bureaucratic impetus mastered by 
the traditional energy corporations. The wind energy market, in turn, suffers from the loss 
of efficiency gains. Ultimately, the excess consumer surplus is wiped away, dead weight 
losses at the market equilibrium inevitably get larger, and delaying the greater adoption of 
renewable technologies in Japan. The status quo favors the existing business practices and 
threatens to delay transition. For example, 
priority dispatch is not given for renewable energy generators in Japan, and 
it is not described in either the FIT Act or the Ministerial Ordinance. 
According to the latest grid rule issued by the Electric Power Council of 
Japan, curtailment of wind and solar generation should be implemented 
before other measures such as interchanges between utilities, curtailment of 
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other power producers and suppliers (independent generators with mainly 
conventional combustion plants), or curtailment of baseload generators.181 
The relatively lower cost of fossil fuels in this decade and the relatively high cost 
of technical deployment of wind power in Japan prohibit the market from accelerating wind 
to a base-load power source state, jeopardizing Japan’s 2030 and 2050 energy mix targets.  
E. PROMISE OF OTHER RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES 
With 1.2% of the population, approximately 127 million, Japan consumes 5.3% of 
the world’s total energy production.182 Photovoltaic and wind are the most prominent 
renewable energy sources in the Japanese economy; however, geothermal, biomass, tidal 
power, and hydrogen technologies are capable suitors to capture niche market segments 
where appropriate. Hydrogen fuel cell technology is perhaps the most prepared for a wide-
scale deployment because of its portability, especially in the transportation sector. The 
versatility of the renewable energy options will allow Japan to remain flexible in deploying 
different regional energy-mix to achieve a high degree of trilemma across the board. The 
utility of certain fuels is inherently higher in specific geographic areas, thus market 
development of such technologies is critical if Japan were to decarbonize beyond 2050, 
consistent with METI’s energy transition plan.  
Two structural factors are key to rapid development of nascent renewable 
technologies in addition to Research and Development (R&D). The GOJ must show the 
same level of support enjoyed by the fossil fuel industry and nuclear energy research 
industry in Japan in the previous decades, facilitating the transition away from current 
energy model and elevating the infrastructure for storage capacities for peak capacity use 
while in a non-peak generation status due to weather patterns, for example. As Komiyama 
and Fujii accurately point out in “addressing seasonal imbalance between solar insolation 
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and electricity demand, hydrogen storage system is regarded as one of the [best] technical 
options.”183 
Japan’s volcanic activity is well documented in history. It should not come as a 
surprise that geothermal power availability in Japan in significant, only behind Indonesia 
and the United States.184 Even though, given the potential, Japan’s production is nominal. 
Shortall and Kharrazi report,  
it [geothermal power] is even more attractive when its low levelized cost, 
high capacity factor, reliability, and flexibility are taken into account. 
Research suggests that by 2050, geothermal electricity generation could 
supply around 3.5% of global electricity production, thus avoiding almost 
800 megatonnes (Mt) of CO2 emissions per year.185  
Geothermal power is not novel to Japan; it operated its first commercial plant in 
1952. According to International Renewable Energy Agency (IREAN), similar to solar and 
wind, Japan’s regulatory and initial cost burden on renewable technologies is high. 
IRENA’s analysis show, “despite Japan’s technical and construction preeminence and its 
significant energy potential, there are only around twenty geothermal plants in Japan, with 
a total output capacity of around 535 MW, only 0.3% of the country’s total electricity 
generation.”186  
Efficiency losses due to temperature variability and drill depth capacity based on 
topology will likely prohibit localized geothermal power to be transported over long 
distance, but provides a suitable option for power generation in areas where geothermal 
power density is high compared to the demand signal. From a social adaption lens, “Japan 
faces significant environmental and social barriers to expanded use of geothermal energy, 
                                                 
183 Komiyama and Fujii, 88. 
184 International Trade Administration, 2016 Top Markets Report Renewable Energy: A Market 
Assessment Tool for U.S. Exporters (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2016), 
https://www.trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Renewable_Energy_Top_Markets_Report.pdf 
185 Ruth Shortall and Ali Kharrazi, “Cultural factors of sustainable energy development: A case study 
of geothermal energy in Iceland and Japan,” Renewable and sustainable energy reviews 79, (November 
2017): 102, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.05.029.  
186 “Unlocking Geothermal Potential in Japan through Small-scale Generation,” International 
Renewable Energy Agency, July 23, 2018, https://www.irena.org/newsroom/articles/2009/Apr/Unlocking-
geothermal-potential-in-Japan-through-small-scale-generation.  
85 
including concerns about potentially adverse impacts on traditional geothermal baths.”187 
Additionally, nearly 80% of energy potential for geothermal in Japan is in natural areas 
protected by the Natural Parks Act, making it exceptionally difficult to lay industrial 
infrastructure surrounding it.188 The markets will not tolerate the uncertainty surrounding 
easing of restrictions by the GOJ to develop geothermal power; hence, the development 
will largely be limited to small-scale development.  
Hydropower, an emissions free resource can also complement the overall 
renewable energy portfolio in Japan with its some 2700 rivers and 600 or so lakes. 
According to International Hydropower Association, Japan has approximately 50 GW of 
installed capacity, including pumped storage to serve its energy needs, which is second in 
Asia behind China’s 341 GW.189 Given the land availability, Japan’s achievement is not 
easily dismissed and hydropower enjoys a very low LCOE, about 0.05 per kWh USD in 
nearly all the markets because it requires minimal infrastructure to support power 
generation.190  
Growth in hydropower is expected to be limited due to the same systemic issues 
faced by other land-derived renewable technologies: regulatory headwinds, environmental 
opposition to development of natural resource due to fear of pollution, limited storage 
capacity during peak-use and non-peak generation gap, transmission issues for feeding 
renewable power to the grid, and curtailment policies. GOJ is aware of these issues, and is 
working to reform the development processes with Japan’s Water Agency. For example, 
amendment of the 2013 River Act has streamlines the permit process to use water for 
energy generation rather than solely dedicated to agricultural use.191 By exposing low risks 
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of the technology to the public, promoting understanding of the overall goal it may be 
possible for METI and GOJ to raise the outlook of hydropower in a post-Fukushima 
context in Japan.  
Biomass energy policy was first introduced in Japan around 2002, nearly a decade 
before Fukushima. It was further codified with 2009 Basic Act for the Promotion of 
Biomass Utilization. Even though current biomass energy sector is under developed, the 
utilization potential remains localized near industrial plants that process the biomass. 
Additional energy required to transport and carbon footprint generated because of it make 
biomass an unlikely candidate for wide adoption potential because “crop potential for 
biomass usage in Japan is limited, despite its square mileage, owing to the disparity of 
climate between northern and southern Japan.”192 Biomass can aid in decentralizing 
energy infrastructure in areas with relatively low population density, aiding energy security 
goals of access, affordability while foregoing carbon emissions associated with energy 
transport.  
Ocean energy is expected to compete for prominence in the energy security of Japan 
as the technology improves and economies of scale develop worldwide. Japan, as an island 
nation has the benefit of unidirectional stable flow generated from ocean currents, periodic 
horizontal flow generated near the coastline by tidal fluctuations, and wave power 
generation derived from universal vertical motion to support its energy needs. A technically 
demanding power generation environment, advances in marine engineering must occur 
before policy prescriptions can be made available for investors. The marine energy market 
overall is quite nascent and immature for commercial investment seeking an ROI. The GOJ 
must continue to subsidize research and early stage investment for prototype development 
for future deployment of ocean energy. The government must continue to facilitate and 
balance industry cooperation between businesses dependent on organic marine resource 
availability against power generation demands. Seafood diet is a staple in Japanese society, 
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thus any restrictions on fishing is likely to meet heavy resistance in legislature and in public 
opinion.  
In addition to the general energy security strategy released by METI and GOJ, a 
separate Basic Hydrogen Strategy was released in December 2017 by Japanese leaders, 
recognizing the huge potential in aiding Japan’s energy security challenges. Japan’s 
technical knowledge has elevated its stature as the leading developer of hydrogen fuel cell 
technologies in the world. Hydrogen is poised to raise Japan’s self-sufficiency 
development ratio (SSR), while reducing import dependence on Middle East fossil fuels 
with the added advantage of reducing Japan’s carbon emissions. The versatility of 
hydrogen is key to its penetration in Japan’s energy security due to its high power density. 
An integrated hydrogen power economy “could foster deep decarbonisation of the 
transport, power, industry and residential sectors while strengthening energy security.”193 
The Hydrogen Council, a co-op between industry and government leaders report that 
“hydrogen use for CO2 emission reduction could create a $2.5 trillion market and 30 
million jobs on the assumption that energy-related CO2 emissions would have to be cut by 
60% by 2050 to achieve the so-called 2℃ scenario.”194 Japan’s hydrogen venture has 
enormous implications for the world’s energy markets as it leads technical innovation of 
hydrogen energy. Not only Japan will benefit from raising its energy security to 
unprecedented levels, but also the economic gains realized from exporting the technology 
will help it compete with China on the international economic stage in East Asia.  
F. FINDINGS 
Japan’s quest toward complete decarbonisation of the economy is aligned to reduce 
not just the political and economic cost, but also the hidden social cost of price volatility 
and intergenerational health of their society. Energy security is not just about access and 
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affordability; it requires reducing the vulnerability of its citizens in a modern society from 
negative externalities suffered from legacy technology and policy. Tarak Shah, writing for 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation says, “Policy makers must view fair competition and 
reliability as co-equal goals. Current policies favor incumbent forms of energy (coal, gas, 
and nuclear) while overstating the reliability challenges associated with variable renewable 
energy.”195 
In Japan, the wholesale electrical power market is merit-ordered for inputs with the 
lowest marginal or variable costs. “The wholesale electricity price is determined by the 
variable cost of the power plant that fills the final portion of demand. Solar photovoltaic 
and wind power have close to zero variable costs and should therefore always dispatch first 
from a cost optimization perspective.”196 However, as mentioned before such is not the 
case because the legacy infrastructure is designed to prioritize traditional fuel sources, and 
with the FIT and curtailment policies, penetration of renewable energy in Japan’s energy 
market has been incremental. As the renewable market capacity increases, thermal power 
plants with higher variable cost-basis will likely be pushed out of the market.  
Information asymmetry remains a barrier for scaled geographic resource 
development. Market failures are inevitable when information is shielded in an effort to 
gain advantage or to capture market share. The government must step in to ensure fair 
market practices to benefit local residents, especially in disaster affected areas such as 
Fukushima who may oppose any technological development as a principal effect of 
negative externalities already suffered. For example with solar technologies, “when 
prefectures share information about renewable resources with local residents, they can 
compete more evenly with extra prefectural companies. However, disaster areas face extra 
governance challenges when introducing solar. Good subnational governance is vital to 
creating a more equitable, locally engaged renewable energy transition.”197  
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Ultimately, the Japanese community demands access to a reliable, affordable, and 
sustainable energy sources powering the economy. In its purest abstracts forms, becomes 
a quest for supply and demand derived from consumer preferences for regional, sub-
national, and national energy security.  
 
Figure 26. Supply and Demand trends in Japan’s renewable energy 
transition.198 
Renewable energy transition is inevitable as costs reach parity with traditional 
sources. The strength of Japan’s transition is embedded in its ability to lead technical 
innovation in engineering as it already dominates manufacturing sector that underlies 
renewable energy equipment. Under the current FIT system, “it is becoming a requirement 
to set a long-term price target and to calculate values such as procurement prices for several 
years into the future. It has become extremely difficult to predict future costs from the sum 
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of the capital cost and cost of operation and maintenance alone….”199 An opportunity 
exists for METI to align incentives to timelines to provide better forecasting of market 
conditions to reduce investor risk. Additionally, this policy reform is likely to allow Japan 
to better compete in exporting its renewable energy expertise with Germany and China. 
Increasing technological diversity on a global scale will force competitive forces of the 
market to draw price equilibrium closer to its true center instead of paying inflated price 
margins designed to recoup initial research and development costs.  
On the demand side, renewable energy growth is driven by changing consumer 
preferences and greater awareness of environmental and social impact of energy generation 
from fossil fuels. The Fukushima incident has significantly raised the opportunity for 
interested investors that were previously sidelined. Younger generations are more likely to 
push leaders to embrace change because they will have to live with the consequences of 
the status quo, which is a threat to the existing system and simultaneously an opportunity 
for innovation. Additionally, consolidating efforts toward a true smart national grid, 
combined with higher storage capacity, is likely to incentivize a higher adoption rate across 
the board on renewables choice availability. Cost-basis for adoption varies geographically 
and that choice based reform becomes critical to snowball transition, especially in urban 
areas where usage density is highest. As Tarak Shah mentions, strengthening market 
reforms such as “electricity futures market, a baseload power market, transmission 
interconnection rules that will require an implicit auction, a capacity market, a zero 
emission credit trading market, and real-time market,”,200are critical to reducing 
transaction costs and streamlining market transition toward greater energy security.  
Restart of nuclear power in Japan, driven by powerful industrial interests with the 
support of the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are likely to undermine the 
accelerated timeline desired to adopt renewable energy sources in Japan’s economy. While 
liberalization of generation and transmission markets have begun, it will take some time to 
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fully remove barriers for renewable technologies to seamlessly integrate in the energy 
markets. 
The future of renewable energy, particularly photovoltaic and wind is optimistic in 
Japan. There are significant economic forces driving the political will to reduce preference 
towards the status quo and allow an only market directed transition away from fossil fuels. 
Global innovation is likely to nudge Japan in accelerated renewable transition. With 
existing headwinds, Japan will likely miss renewable energy adoption goals of 2030 but 
may exceed it for the 2050s energy mix to secure an affordable, accessible, and 
environmentally sustainable energy future.  
Lastly, across Japan, South Korea, and China, the potential for renewable energy is 
strong and abundant. If the political capital exists, then a sufficient opportunity also exists 
in East Asia to create a massive super grid to transfer energy resources in real time as 
needed, much like in Europe. Creating economic and energy interdependence may ease 
political and geographic tensions in the long run as an ancillary benefit of industrialized 
economies transitioning to renewable power together. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this analysis, the various aspects of Japan’s energy security are discussed in 
METI’s 3E + S framework. The disparity between Japan’s economic output and 
availability of domestic resources is high, making Japan one of the most resource deficient 
industrialized nations in the world. After World War II, Japan’s industrial capacity rose 
rapidly and the energy requirements in the consumer and industrial sector with it. Much of 
the infrastructure developed in the decades following World War II was set up with fossil 
fuels as a baseline and abundant source. Japan has expertly navigated resource diplomacy 
throughout the past seven decades to ensure a ready and affordable supply of energy. Policy 
proposals were enacted by the GOJ to reduce supply shocks after the oil crises of the 1970s 
to tame the supply disruption supporting economic activity. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear 
disaster highlighted Japan’s vulnerability in energy security. Even though much of the 
traditional, fossil fuel based supply chains were undisturbed, it emphasized the country’s 
overwhelming reliance on a single energy source to sustain most of its economic activity.  
Fossil fuels and the abundance of cheap energy has played a key role in elevating 
the welfare of citizens across countless states, including Japan. Cheap and readily available, 
fossil fuels have been used to thrust the economic well-being of a society ahead of social 
and environmental well-being of humans as a species. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s (IPCC) report on energy systems specifically outline the importance of 
decarbonisation in all economies. The report advises in favor of implementing economic 
policies in support of shifting away from fossil fuels, developing infrastructure that can 
support multiple base-load energy sources, supporting nascent advanced renewable 
technologies, and most importantly adopt a large-scale Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
technologies to simultaneously remove excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere while 
promoting utilization of alternate renewable energy sources. In Japan, “although the 
nuclear accident represented a serious blow to the country’s energy transition to a reduced 
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carbon environment, the country has not been deterred from this goal.”201 As the 
preeminent leader in technological development combined with an environmentally 
conscience electorate, Japan has been diligently working to achieve its commitments made 
at the Kyoto Protocol and reaffirmed and expanded at COP21 and COP23.  
The Fukushima nuclear disaster simply accelerated the inevitable debate in 
Japanese politics of energy transition and greater domestic self-reliance within the energy 
trilemma of access and equity, affordability and environmental security. The enormous 
economic and political cost of radioactive material clean up eroded public trust in the 
government. As Looney writes in Handbook of Transitions to Energy and Climate 
Security, “The energy trilemma is not a universal constant that will be with us for the 
indefinite future.”202 World Energy Council’s 2019 Energy Trilemma Index highlights the 
Nordic countries’ policies and achievement toward high degree of attainment within the 
trilemma while reforming the economic landscape. Energy economics and its associated 
market forces of supply and demand are key to swinging the impetus of energy use toward 
a carbon-neutral and clean technologies for consumer and industrial energy requirements. 
A generational change and an existential crisis is likely to push leaders and governments 
toward a clean energy future. Yergin writes that “the interaction of environmental concerns 
with energy will continue to shape the energy marketplace.”203 
Discussed in the fossil fuels Chapter of this analysis, the challenge to Japan’s 
transition away from fossil fuels remain formidable. Woven in every aspect of industrial 
and citizen consumption, the infrastructure supports the status quo. Fossil fuel reliance 
enjoy the built in economic advantage such that they require no change in consumption 
preferences resulting in no added cost. The debate to adopt alternate sources for reducing 
atmospheric carbon is a moral one in a sustainable future. While Japan has diversified its 
traditional fuels portfolio to include Southeast Asian suppliers for oil and coal, the LNG 
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import policy promises to reduce foreign import dependence. The newly formed energy 
partnership with the United States is likely to reduce supply shocks and lower political 
risks associated with foreign energy dependence. Additionally, reform of the power 
generation and transmission markets expected to be complete by 2020 is likely to create 
more efficiency in energy exchange markets. Tremendous pressure from powerful energy 
companies in Japan have made it more difficult for alternate energy source penetration in 
Japan’s markets.  
The two distinct goals towards 2030 and 2050 set by METI face two specific 
structural challenges. Equity and access to energy are not as important for Japan compared 
to stable cost and reduced environmental impact. For 2030 objectives, the decision making 
revolve around economic policies and liberalization of markets in which fair competition 
and advancement of co-equal status of various energy sources is critical in consideration 
with the social cost of carbon. Whereas for 2050 objectives, the larger question of how to 
shift consumer preferences away from fossil fuels by setting up the infrastructure that 
allows the market clearing for energy transition choices while stemming anthropogenic 
change becomes more important. Japan’s sluggish economic growth is likely to rearrange 
the political agenda toward economic expansion and economic stability and away from 
energy security. Hence, Japan’s 2030 energy security targets are likely to be missed; 
however, Japan’s 2050 energy mix targets are very achievable in a quest to decarbonize 
major sectors of the economy.  
In nuclear power, Japan’s future is more complicated. Politically, the nuclear 
energy sector enjoys the support of the GOJ led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The 
government has made significant efforts toward increased transparency in the aftermath of 
Fukushima. Economically, the transition away from nuclear power is more difficult and 
costly. The incredible cost paid to get the reactor technology servicing the Japanese 
economy has not been realized thus far in returns. Much of the nuclear fleet still await 
safety inspections and NRA approval to start producing power again, which can lower 
domestic power generation costs. A strong public sentiment against nuclear power has 
generally abated, with vast majority of Japanese citizens choosing domestic energy 
stability instead of total foreign reliance.  
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Economically, it is viable to operate every nuclear reactor plant until the end of its 
designed service life because the sunk cost cannot be reclaimed and variable cost of 
operation is substantially lower per kWh, compared to traditional sources. Nuclear power 
helps Japan raise its SSR while stemming supply shocks. Additionally, nuclear power is 
scalable in its use as the usage patterns shift with a demographic change, a strong 
advantage. Even though post-decommissioning safety costs exist for nuclear power, it 
remains a cornerstone of Japan’s energy security for the foreseeable future. If a similar 
level of governmental support applied to nascent nuclear technologies in the past can be 
transferred to nascent renewable technologies of the future, the efficiency gains likely to 
realize from economies of scale are large. Given Japan’s topography, reasonable safety 
risks exist for Japan’s existing nuclear fleet; however, stringent requirements from the 
NRA prior to re-start approval is likely to help the public gain confidence in reintroducing 
nuclear power within Japan on a similar scale prior to March 2011.  
In a transition away from nuclear power, Japan is well advised to recapture gains 
from thermal fission foregone over the past eight years due to a nationwide shutdown of 
reactors. In the medium term, nuclear power is an efficient solution to support Japan’s 
energy prerequisites of net zero carbon emissions from operation as it undergoes transition. 
It is a significant strength of thermal fission. Letting innovation forces compete freely to 
erode the nuclear power advantage is economically suitable because the opportunity cost 
of delaying capital investment into renewable energy enterprise is extremely high. Current 
idling of reactor plants without safety approval from The NRA make it more challenging 
for Japan to meet its 2030 energy-mix goals; however, full decarbonisation toward 2050 is 
an attainable goal if nuclear power is used as a transitional energy bridge.  
Lastly, advances in renewable technologies are making it challenging for countries, 
including Japan, to adhere to the status quo. Continually lowered cost, geographically 
specific integration options, net-zero and net-positive carbon technologies, and innovation 
driven economies of scale are likely to offset fossil fuel dominance going forward. A 
central challenge to renewable technology adoption in energy security is market saturation. 
It tends to stagnate costs and casts an unstable pathway for investors, institutions, and 
governments. Both supply side and demand side of the renewable marketplace must strive 
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toward cost parity and LCOE to accelerate market penetration. Prohibitive policies such as 
power curtailment are likely to risk market failure in energy transition away from fossil 
fuels. FIT must be continuously adjusted to accommodate a change in total energy capacity 
provided by renewables in Japan.  
Japan remains a technical leader in renewable energy, but faces stiff competition in 
the cost of photovoltaic manufacturing from the Chinese and German firms. It is eroding 
market share from the Japanese firms and thus reducing incentive to widen the supply 
available to consumers. The outlook for wind turbine is a little better but could escalate to 
similar levels. Japan’s renewable energy adoption energy strategy should be driven by 
regional suitability. Photovoltaic is generally universally applicable and feasible. Onshore 
and offshore wind have specific issues that need to be resolved with better engineering and 
political solutions to be viable economically on a large scale. Power density of sources vary 
dramatically based on where they are adopted and on what scale. The abundance of 
geothermal power remains weakly exploited due to social opposition rising from the high 
favorability of traditional onsen baths. Above all, the generated capacity is limited by 
transmission infrastructure set up to support fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Japanese 
energy markets must allow un-curtailed feed of renewable power at a cost-basis acceptable 
to both the consumer and electric utilities to wipe out negative externalities and reach a 
new supply-demand equilibrium. The regulatory environment undergoing reform is easing 
some of the land-use restrictions, helping investors gain confidence in the Japanese market.  
Overall, METI and ANRE have done a commendable job in reforming the energy 
marketplace to allow greater penetration of photovoltaic and wind (both onshore and 
offshore), though more reform is needed in favor of the consumer and not the utilities 
conglomerate. Renewable technologies offer the greatest versatility for adoption given 
Japan’s topography. Forecasting long-term price targeting is critical for investors to shift 
capital from energy sources with known ROI to ones with more uncertainty but a higher 
promise. As communities and socially responsible corporations demand reliable, 
affordable, and responsible energy generation and use, Japan’s intertemporal energy mix 
must change with it. Continued liberalization of generation and transmission markets, 
expected is likely to pave a pathway toward reducing market saturation in photovoltaic and 
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wind enabled generation. Japan is likely to need a resilient and competitive renewable 
energy portfolio to sustain economic growth in order to remain in the top tier of 
industrialized nations. Exporting emerging technologies is an excellent way to support 
Japanese industry leading the technical innovation. Many opportunities exist for Japanese 
firms to capture a significant market share in hydrogen and marine energy technologies. 
Current reform policies are insufficient to gain a large-scale energy transition momentum 
by 2030. Japan’s 2050 goals of decarbonisation of major sectors of the economy enjoy a 
higher level of certainty.  
Japan’s energy trilemma remained essentially unchanged from 2018 to 2019. Japan 
realized minor gains in import reduction, achieving a balanced energy intensity, per capita 
reduction in carbon emissions, and raising the effectiveness of the central government to 
make headway toward its stated goal. Technical innovation and development continues to 
be Japan’s strongest characteristic and will affect the timeline of Japan’s energy transition. 
Long timeline for reform and the perceived lack of urgency from an industry vested in 
capital returns weakens Japan’s transition and overall energy security. Status quo undercuts 
consumer preference and the global tide toward decarbonisation. In the medium term, 
opportunity exists to quickly restart idle nuclear power plants to simultaneously reduce 
import dependence and carbon emissions, and in the long-term, exporting of innovative 
and affordable renewable technologies offer the greatest opportunity for the Japanese firms 
to achieve energy security and economic vibrancy simultaneously. One of the greatest 
threats to Japan’s transition is the zero-sum energy market in Asia. The markets are sending 
a strong demand signal, amid political tension and instability from current suppliers, 
mainly in the Middle East. The fragile state of transition requires time to fully embrace the 
evolution, or else it will default to the cheapest and most easily available energy source. 
And that is coal and oil, and it will set Japan back a couple of decades in its quest to become 
energy secure or more yet, energy independent.  
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